关键词: 电动汽车, 汽车供应链, 电池租赁服务, 博弈论, 定价

Abstract: In recent years, new forces in car manufacturing have emerged under the guidance of the national “dual carbon” strategy. The automotive industry is accelerating towards green and low-carbon development, and the power exchange mode as an efficient energy supplement method has received high attention from the industry. Electrification is the most promising means to move towards decarbonization. Carbon reduction in the automotive industry cannot be achieved without the efforts of battery suppliers, automotive companies, and consumers, among which automotive companies and battery providers, as direct suppliers of automotive products, play a pivotal role. Given the above background, the article mainly addresses four issues: First, who provides the electric vehicle battery rental service? Second, what is the optimal equilibrium solution between electric vehicle manufacturers and battery providers under different rental service modes? Third, how do electric vehicle manufacturers and battery providers make decisions to maximize benefits? Fourth, what leasing strategies are the most beneficial for consumers?
Taking the supply chain composed of electric vehicle manufacturers and battery providers as the research object, we construct a game model for rental services in the electric vehicle supply chain to illustrate three types of rental service strategies for members of the electric vehicle supply chain: strategy M (m led rental service strategy), strategy S (s led rental service strategy), strategy C (m and s cooperate to dominate the leasing service strategy). We simultaneously study the optimal leasing service level and pricing strategy issues under the three strategies, as well as the impact of related factors such as battery leasing times, marginal cost of leasing services, and cost sharing ratio on the optimal decision.
The research results show that: (1)Increasing the number of battery rentals under strategy M can promote m to improve their rental service levels, and consumers are more willing to increase demand under high-level rental services. (2)When s acts as the leader of leasing services under strategy S, increasing the number of battery rentals will correspondingly increase the battery rental price, which is more conducive to improving the profit of the battery provider. (3)Under strategy C, when electric vehicle manufacturers and battery providers cooperate to lead rental services, the battery provider helps the manufacturer actively share θ, for electric vehicle manufacturers have always been in an advantageous position in terms of rental service costs. Under strategy C, manufacturers and battery providers work together to improve the leasing service level, enabling consumers to obtain more high-quality services. Thus, strategy C will attract more consumers.
At the same time, the following management implications are obtained: (1)Manufacturers: when their leader rents services, vigorously improving the level of rental service efforts can win more consumers’ favor, but increasing consumer demand and the number of battery rentals will be more beneficial to manufacturers and battery providers. (2)Battery providers: as a leader in leasing services, strategy S is more conducive to improving the profits of battery providers. As a follower of rental services, manufacturers can obtain relatively high profits only when the degree of rental service preference and the marginal cost of rental service level meet certain conditions. (3)Consumers: under strategy C, manufacturers and battery providers work together to improve rental service levels, enabling consumers to receive more high-quality services. (4)Government: when making policies related to electric vehicles, the government should call on or guide chain members to control the marginal cost of rental services within a reasonable range while they are striving to improve the level of rental services.
The conclusions of this article have certain theoretical guidance significance for m and s to implement battery rental service strategies in the supply chain environment. However, this article only studies the issue of leasing service leaders and optimal leasing service strategies, but does not address the issue of consumer market segmentation. At the same time, considering the issue of dual channel sales between electric vehicle manufacturers and retailers is also the direction of further in-depth research.

Key words: electric vehicles, vehicle supply chain, battery leasing services, game theory, pricing