运筹与管理 ›› 2025, Vol. 34 ›› Issue (3): 63-69.DOI: 10.12005/orms.2025.0077

• 理论分析与方法探讨 • 上一篇    下一篇

“双积分”政策下考虑研发投入的传统车企定价决策研究

郑艳芳, 赵巧杰, 党永杰   

  1. 河南大学 商学院,河南 开封 475000
  • 收稿日期:2023-04-14 出版日期:2025-03-25 发布日期:2025-07-04
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金青年科学基金项目(71801084);2023年河南省软科学研究计划项目(232400411074)

Research on Pricing Decision of Traditional Automobile Enterprises Considering R&D Investment under “Dual-credits” Policy

ZHENG Yanfang, ZHAO Qiaojie, DANG Yongjie   

  1. Business School, Henan University, Kaifeng 475000, China
  • Received:2023-04-14 Online:2025-03-25 Published:2025-07-04

摘要: 基于“双积分”政策下车企注重新能源汽车而忽略燃油汽车的研发现状,本文以同时生产燃油汽车和新能源汽车的传统车企为研究对象,通过构建制造商和零售商组成的两阶段博弈模型,分别分析集中决策和分散决策下考虑研发投入时传统汽车企业的定价行为,运用K-S分配方法对分散决策下的供应链总利润进行协调再分配,通过数值分析积分交易价格和积分比例对利润和积分交易量的影响。结果发现:“双积分”政策下,加大某种车型的研发投入,可能会降低自身的产量并且提高替代产品的产量;加大燃油汽车和新能源汽车的研发投入可以扩大新能源积分交易价格对市场总需求的正向作用范围;加大燃油汽车的研发投入可以提高供应链的利润,加大新能源汽车的研发投入可能会降低供应链的利润;提高新能源积分交易价格和降低新能源积分比例均可以提高供应链的利润。

关键词: “双积分”政策, 研发投入, 传统车企, 新能源汽车, 燃油汽车

Abstract: China implemented the “dual-credit” policy in 2018. The new version of the “dual-credit” policy released in 2021 clearly encourages traditional fuel vehicles (FV) to reduce the energy conservation and prevent automobile enterprises from placing too much emphasis on the development of pure electric vehicles to ignore the problem of fuel consumption saving of traditional FV. Since the “dual-credit” policy was implemented, most backbone passenger automobile manufacturers have failed to meet the assessment standards, the innovation degree of FV and NEV produced is still not high, and the R&D investment is quite low. Most of the previous studies have ignored the fuel consumption of FV, and even if a small number of studies have paid attention to this problem, they have not considered the influence of the R&D investment of FV on the pricing decision of NEV for a traditional automobile enterprise. Therefore, we want to explore how the R&D investment impacts the decision-making of the automobile enterprises. The result will provide suggestions for decision-making R&D investment of traditional automobile enterprises.
This paper takes the traditional automobile enterprises that produce both FV and NEV as the research object. Through a two-stage game model composed of a manufacturer and a retailer, we firstly analyze the pricing decisions of the automobile enterprises with the R&D investment under decentralized and centralized scenarios. Secondly, based on the optimal decision of the automobiles, we study the sensitivity analysis of some parameters on quantity and profits of the automobiles. Finally, we adopt the K-S method to redistribute the profits obtained by all member enterprises in the supply chain. In view of the complexity of calculation, numerical examples are used to discuss how some parameters impact the profit of supply chain and the credit trading quantity. Besides, we use a numerical example to verify the effectiveness of the coordination mechanism. The results show that: (1)Under the “dual-credit” policy, increasing the R&D investment of a certain type of vehicles may reduce its own output and increase the output of alternative products. (2)Increasing R&D investment of FV can improve the profit of the supply chain, while increasing R&D investment of NEV may reduce the profit of the supply chain. (3)Increasing the credit trading price and reducing the proportion requirements for NEV production can improve the profit of the supply chain. Some management implications can be obtained from the above conclusions, which are as follows. (1)When making R&D investment decisions, the traditional automobile enterprises should evaluate the current level of R&D investment. (2)When the traditional automobile enterprises conduct the R&D investment of NEV, they should reasonably grasp the intensity of the R&D investment. (3)The government should use policies to properly regulate credit trading price, and let the “dual-credit” policy play a real role in promoting the high-quality development of NEV.
As this paper is written on the basis of certain assumptions, it can be expanded from the following aspects in future. First, we just consider a monopoly game in this paper, however, multiple automobile enterprises competing with each other is a common phenomenon in the automobile market, so the decision-making of more than two automobile enterprises considering the R&D investment is worthy of future study. Second, the credit trading price is exogenous in this paper, however, the credit trading price is affected by the demand and supply of the credits. So, it is necessary to consider the credit trading price to be endogenous in future.

Key words: “dual-credit” policy, R&D investment, traditional automobile enterprises, new energy vehicles, fuel vehicles

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