供应商竞争下的供应链多边谈判

运筹与管理 ›› 2011, Vol. 20 ›› Issue (2): 50-56.

供应商竞争下的供应链多边谈判

刘强, 苏秦

西安交通大学管理学院,陕西西安 710049;机械制造系统国家重点实验室,陕西西安 710049;过程控制与效率工程教育部重点实验室,陕西西安 710049

收稿日期:2009-10-01 出版日期:2011-04-25
作者简介:刘强(1980- ),河南安阳人,博士研究生,研究方向为质量管理和供应链管理;苏秦(1963-),河南民权人,教授,研究方向为质量管理和供应链管理。
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70872091);高等学校博士点专项基金资助项目(20090201110031)

Supply Chain Multilateral Negotiation under Supplier Competitions

LIU Qiang, SU Qin

School of Management, Xi’an Jiaotong University, Xi’an 710049, PRC; State Key Laboratory for Manufacturing Systems Engineering, Xi’an 710049, China; The Key Lab of the Ministry of Education for Process Control & Efficiency Engineering, Xi’an 710049, China

Received:2009-10-01 Online:2011-04-25

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 探讨了单买方多供应商基于供应链利润分配的多边谈判,其中的供应商具有不同讨价还价力。多边谈判程序为买方与单个供应商轮流进行双边谈判。此种情形下,供应商参与双边谈判的顺序影响供应商所获谈判利润,同时基于讨价还价力供应商通过向买方支付排位费用竞争双边谈判位置。结果给出了供应商竞争下多边谈判的唯一均衡,以及均衡状态下各方所获利润。本文构建了供应商讨价还价力不同情形下供应链多边谈判分析框架,并指出讨价还价力的不同使能力强的供应商通过竞争双边谈判位置而获利。

关键词: 管理科学与工程, 供应链多边谈判, 讨价还价理论, 供应商竞争

Abstract: Multilateral negotiation based on the distribution of supply chain profit is discussed between one buyer and multiple suppliers who have different bargaining powers. The procedure of multilateral negotiation is that bilateral negotiations are sequentially pursued by the buyer and the single supplier. In this case, the negotiation profits gained by suppliers are influenced by the orders in which suppliers join bilateral negotiations. Based on bargaining powers suppliers compete for the positions of bilateral negotiations by paying the buyer position fees. The result gives the unique equilibrium of multilateral negotiation under supplier competitions and each party’s profit in equilibrium. This paper establishes analytical framework of supply chain multilateral negotiation in which suppliers have different bargaining powers, and points out it is the different bargaining powers that bring about extra profits to suppliers with more power through the competitions of bilateral negotiation positions.

Key words: management science and engineering, supply chain multilateral negotiation, bargaining theory, supplier competition

中图分类号:

F715.4

刘强, 苏秦. 供应商竞争下的供应链多边谈判[J]. 运筹与管理, 2011, 20(2): 50-56.

LIU Qiang, SU Qin. Supply Chain Multilateral Negotiation under Supplier Competitions[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2011, 20(2): 50-56.

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