关键词: 管理科学与工程, 政企联合, 合作机理, 博弈, shapley值, 应急物资储备

Abstract: For some kind of emergency supplies, the joint of government and enterprises can reduce the cost of government, and the enterprises can also benefit from it. This paper studies the mechanism of cooperation between government and enterprises in emergency supplies reserve. First it analyses the game between the alliance participants; then it uses the shapley value to solve the revenue distribution problem in the alliance; finally it analyses the stability of the alliance. The example analysis shows that the relationship between the government and enterprises in the alliance is similar to the relationship between “landlords” and “peasants”; the enterprises are reluctant to join the alliance when the earnings they gain are less than their opportunity cost, the government needs to cross-subsidize enterprises to maintain the stability of the alliance. When the shortage cost is less than the cost of government reserve, the government will choose shortage or join with the enterprises. When the shortage cost is less than the cost of enterprise reserve, the government will choose shortage.