关键词: 管理学, 薪酬契约, 价值创造, 长短期业绩, 垄断盈余

Abstract: Nowadays, managers’ compensation contract mostly takes profit as performance measure standard and is designed according to short-term performance, which easily induces managers’ short-term behavior. This paper regards value creation as performance measure standard and integrates long-term and short-term performance into managers’ compensation contract. Its conclusion concludes three aspects: In the first, managers in monopoly industries make less effort than ones in competitive industries, and the greater the proportion of monopoly earnings is, the less effort managers make, so it is necessary to introduce competitive mechanism in monopoly industries in order to motivate managers’enthusiasm. Secondly, the bigger the proportion of surplus share is, the more effort managers make, and the higher per-unit effort cost is, the less effort managers choose. Higher capable managers usually select more effort,which means that managers should be selected carefully and given better working environment,and the proportion of surplus share should be designed freely in order to improve managers’effort. Thirdly, managers’ short-term behavior in competitive industries is more than that in monopoly industries, so it is wise to design managers’ compensation contract based value creation and combination of long-term and short-term performance.

Key words: management, compensation contract, value creation, long-term and short-term performance, monopoly earnings