关键词: 管理科学, 技术授权, 古诺竞争博弈, 内生技术创新, 社会福利

Abstract: Constructing a duopoly model of licensing with endogenous cost-reducing innovation in horizontal difference, we compare profit, consumer surplus, social welfare and degree of technology innovation under different patterns of licensing. It is found that the patent holder will always increase its profit through two-part tariff or royalties. Royalties can yield the optimal profit while fixed-fee may lead to profit loss. Consumer surplus and social welfare are maximized under the regime of fixed-fee compared with two-part tariff and royalties. The degree of innovation depends on the pattern of licensing and the degree of substitution between the goods. No matter what the degree of substitution is, two-part tariff can achieve the highest degree of innovation.

Key words: management science, licensing, cournort competition, endogenous technology innovation, social welfare