基于Choquet积分形式的模糊联盟核心

doi:10.12005/orms.2015.0013

运筹与管理 ›› 2015, Vol. 24 ›› Issue (1): 93-99.DOI: 10.12005/orms.2015.0013

基于Choquet积分形式的模糊联盟核心

孙红霞

北京工商大学商学院,北京 100048

收稿日期:2013-09-03 出版日期:2015-02-12
作者简介:孙红霞(1980-),女,博士,研究方向:合作对策理论及应用。
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71401003);教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金(14YJC630114);国有资产管理协同创新项目资助(GZ20131001)

Fuzzy Coalition Core with Choquet Integral Form

SUN Hong-xia

School of Business, Beijing Technology and Business University, Beijing 100081, China

Received:2013-09-03 Online:2015-02-12

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 在具有联盟结构的合作对策中,针对局中人以某种程度参与到合作中的情况,研究了模糊联盟结构的合作对策的收益分配问题。首先,定义了具有模糊联盟结构的合作对策及相关概念。其次,定义了Choquet积分形式的模糊联盟核心,提出了该核心与联盟核心之间的关系,对于强凸联盟对策,证明Choquet积分形式的模糊Owen值属于其所对应的模糊联盟核心。最后通过算例,对该分配模型的可行性进行分析。

关键词: 对策论, 模糊联盟对策, 模糊联盟核心, 联盟结构

Abstract: In the framework of cooperative games with coalition structure, under the assumption that priori unions and players do not fully participate in the cooperation,the paper studies the problem of profit allocation. First, it gives the definition of cooperative games with fuzzy coalition structure and its associated definition. Then, fuzzy coalition core with Choquet integral form is defined. It proposes the relationship between the fuzzy coalition core with Choquet integral form and coalition core. It proves that fuzzy Owen value with Choquet integral form belongs to fuzzy coalition while the cooperative game is a strong convex coalition game. Finally, it gives an example to verify the allocation method.

Key words: game theory, game with fuzzy coalition, fuzzy coalition core, coalition structure

中图分类号:

O225

孙红霞. 基于Choquet积分形式的模糊联盟核心[J]. 运筹与管理, 2015, 24(1): 93-99.

SUN Hong-xia. Fuzzy Coalition Core with Choquet Integral Form[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2015, 24(1): 93-99.

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基于Choquet积分形式的模糊联盟核心

Fuzzy Coalition Core with Choquet Integral Form

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