一类具有限制联盟结构的合作对策的两阶段Shapley值

doi:10.12005/orms.2019.0103

运筹与管理 ›› 2019, Vol. 28 ›› Issue (5): 56-60.DOI: 10.12005/orms.2019.0103

一类具有限制联盟结构的合作对策的两阶段Shapley值

王利明^1,2

1.内蒙古财经大学统计与数学学院,内蒙古呼和浩特 010070;
2.内蒙古经济数据分析与挖掘重点实验室,内蒙古呼和浩特 010070

收稿日期:2018-09-11 出版日期:2019-05-25
作者简介:王利明 (1983-),男,山西孝义人,讲师,博士,研究方向:合作博弈。
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71771025,71661024,71561022);内蒙古自然科学基金资助项目(2017MS0715)

A Two-Step Shapley Value for a Kind of Cooperative Games with Restricted Coalition Structure

WANG Li-ming

1.School of Statistics and Mathematics, Inner Mongolia University of Finance and Economics, Hohhot 010070, China;
2.Inner Mongolia key laboratory of economic data analysis and mining, Hohhot 010070, China

Received:2018-09-11 Online:2019-05-25

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 讨论一类具有限制联盟结构的合作对策,其中局中人通过优先联盟整体参与大联盟的合作,同时优先联盟内部有合取权限结构限制,利用两阶段Shapley值的分配思想并考虑到权限结构对优先联盟内合作的限制,给出了此类合作对策的解。该解可看做具有联盟结构的合作对策的两阶段Shapley值的推广。证明了该解满足的公理化条件,并验证了这些条件的独立性。

关键词: 合作对策, 联盟结构, 权限结构, 两阶段Shapley值

Abstract: A kind of cooperative games with restricted coalition structure are discussed, in which players participate in the cooperation of the grand coalition through the priori unions as a whole and there are conjunctive permission structures within the priori unions. A solution to this kind of cooperative games is given by using the two-step Shapley value distribution idea and taking into account the limits of permission structure on cooperation within the priori unions. This solution can be seen as a generalization of the two-step Shapley value for games with coalition structures. The axiomatization conditions of the solution are proved, and the independence of these conditions is verified.

Key words: cooperative game, coalition structure, permission structure, two-step Shapley value

中图分类号:

O225

王利明. 一类具有限制联盟结构的合作对策的两阶段Shapley值[J]. 运筹与管理, 2019, 28(5): 56-60.

WANG Li-ming. A Two-Step Shapley Value for a Kind of Cooperative Games with Restricted Coalition Structure[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2019, 28(5): 56-60.

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一类具有限制联盟结构的合作对策的两阶段Shapley值

A Two-Step Shapley Value for a Kind of Cooperative Games with Restricted Coalition Structure

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