关键词: 碳交易, 碳减排, 低碳意识, 低碳推广, 信息分享

Abstract: Asymmetric information Stackelberg game is proposed for one manufacturer-two retailers supply chain. The emission reduction and low carbon promotion decisions under the cap-and-trade system are explored. The paper investigates the condition under which the retailers will share their low-carbon promotion efficiency information with the manufacturer. Also, the paper analyzes the impacts of consumers’ low-carbon awareness, carbon trade price, retailer competition intensity, low-carbon promotion efficiency and its uncertainty on the supply chain members’ optimal decisions profits. It shows that the retailers’ promotion decisions are only affected by parameters of themselves. A retailer shares its cost information with the manufacturer only if its low-carbon promotion is efficiently enough. The manufacturer’s optimal emission reduction increases with the carbon trade price, consumers’ low-carbon awareness, the retailers’ low-carbon promotion efficiency and uncertainty, and decreases with the retailer competition intensity. The optimal profits of the supply chain members increase with the carbon trade price, consumers’ low-carbon awareness, and decrease with intensity of retailer competition. As the low-carbon promotion efficiency uncertainty of the industry increases, the optimal profit of the manufacturer decreases while that of the retailer increases. When only one retailer is willing to disclose it cost information, the manufacturer can’t afford to pay another retailer to obtain its private cost information.

Key words: cap-and-trade, carbon emission reduction, low-carbon awareness, low carbon promotion, information sharin