关键词: Rubinstein谈判博弈, 损失厌恶, 谈判破裂, 子博弈完美均衡, Nash谈判解

Abstract: Rubinstein bargaining is reconsidered under the assumption that players are loss averse and bargaining has a risk of breakdown. First, a subgame perfect equilibrium is constructed. We show the existence and uniqueness of this subgame perfect equilibrium. Then, the analysis of the subgame perfect equilibrium with respect to loss aversion coefficients and probability of breakdown is performed. It is found that players benefit from their opponents' loss aversion and are hurt by their own loss aversion. It is also found that the changes of equilibrium outcomes as the probability of breakdown depend on discount factor and loss-aversion coefficient of players. It is further found that the limit equilibrium partition for the probability of breakdown tending to zero is identical to the classical Rubinstein case. Finally, a relation with asymmetric Nash bargaining is established, where a player's bargaining power is negatively related to his own levels of loss aversion and positively to the opponent's levels of loss aversion, and depends on the ratio between the probability of breakdown and time lapse between proposals.

Key words: Rubinstein bargaining game, loss aversion, bargaining breakdown, subgame perfect equilibrium, Nash bargaining solution