关键词: 公众参与, 环境规制, 演化博弈, 仿真

Abstract: In China, the relevant subjects of the environmental governance system are mainly the central government, local governments and enterprises. In recent years, with the continuous progress of industrialization, the problem of environmental pollution has become increasingly serious. Pollution incidents in some areas have occurred repeatedly, especially haze, water pollution and other problems, which have aroused public concern and participation in the environmental crisis. The increasing awareness of public participation has led to the continuous improvement of the degree of public participation in environmental governance, which leads to the question of whether public participation will affect the strategic choices of the relevant subjects of environmental governance, and if so, what is the extent of its impact? The comparative analysis of public participation in the basic tripartite evolutionary game model of environmental regulation in the form of parameters can answer this question clearly and intuitively, and at the same time, it has important practical significance on how to stably play the role of public participation in environmental governance, control the uncertainty of public participation as much as possible, and then optimize the environmental governance strategies of relevant subjects and improve the efficiency of environmental governance. First of all, taking the mainstream forces in the environmental governance system—the central government, local governments and enterprises as the main body, this paper constructs a basic framework of a tripartite evolutionary game model, and explores how the three parties choose environmental regulation strategies without considering public factors. Then, on the basis of the above model, the relevant parameters of public participation are introduced to construct a central-local-enterprise tripartite evolutionary game model under public participation to investigate the influence mechanism of public participation on environmental governance. Finally, drawing lessons from the parameter setting methods in the existing literature, in the case of changing the relevant parameters of public participation, MATLAB simulation is carried out to simulate the evolution path of each subject strategy choice in the system, so as to explore more intuitively the influence of public participation on the choice of tripartite subject strategy of central land and enterprises. It is found that: (1)Public participation has an inhibitory effect on illegal pollution discharge by enterprises and, to a certain extent, plays a substitute role in the implementation of environmental regulation by local governments; Public participation plays a positive role in promoting the active implementation of environmental regulation by local governments, and to a certain extent, it plays a substitute role in the supervision of the central government. The increase of public reporting incentives will promote the probability and speed of evolution of local governments to active implementation, improve the probability of evolution of the central government to non-strict supervision, and reduce the probability and speed of enterprises’ evolution to illegal pollutant discharge; Theimprovement of enterprise energy saving and emission reduction technology plays a positive and positive role in promoting both enterprises and local governments. (2)The effect of the environmental protection policy implemented for the public is better than that for the local government and enterprises, and the direct reporting reward to the public can accelerate the stability of the system. This promoting effect is more obvious than that produced by the implementation of environmental protection policies for local governments and enterprises. (3)There is an inverted “U” relationship between the public reporting reward and the steady state of the system: When the public reporting reward level does not exceed the inflection point, increasing the public reporting reward level will help to achieve the stability of the system, but when the public reporting reward level exceeds the inflection point, if we further improve the public reporting reward, its role will gradually shift from promotion to suppression, which will hinder the stability of the system. On the one hand, the central government needs to strengthen the incentive and restraint on the behavior of local governments by the combination of evaluation incentive and reputation punishment mechanism, so as to improve the enthusiasm of enterprises to reduce emissions, and on the other hand, it should establish and improve the system of public participation in environmental protection, encourage the public to actively participate in the governance of the ecological environment, and require the public to exercise their corresponding rights in accordance with the law on the basis of meeting a certain incentive intensity, in order to avoid disorderly and ineffective participation caused by too many people participating in environmental governance in reality.

Key words: public participation, environmental regulation, evolutionary game, simulation