关键词: 碳交易规制, 政府补贴, 光电企业收益, 融资策略, 博弈演化

Abstract: With the implementation and deepening of the carbon peaking and carbon neutrality goals, China’s photovoltaic (PV) industry has witnessed a leapfrog development in terms of installed scale and technological innovation. The frenzied expansion of production has left much of China’s photovoltaic industry with production links far in excess of actual market demand. The “absolute excess” capacity leads to fierce competition and excessive reshuffle in the industry. Against the backdrop of price competition and technological upgrades, PV companies need to invest more in technology development to meet the challenges of survival. However, in recent years, most PV enterprises in China have been in the initial stage, and the internal capital size of enterprises is not sufficient to support extreme R&D costs. In addition, the lengthy investment cycle of the photovoltaic industry and the low capital recovery rate make it difficult for photovoltaic companies to obtain conventional financing in terms of government subsidies and bank credit. With the maturity of various mechanisms in the carbon trading market, stable financing channels resulting from emissions reduction benefits will considerably alleviate financing difficulties in the financial markets for PV companies due to unstable output and high risk. However, to expand the new financing channels, it is necessary to further study the mechanisms by which carbon trading regulation affects subsidy policies and production decisions of governments and PV companies.
In this paper, based on the evolutionary game model, we construct a system dynamics model with government subsidies, production expansion of PV companies, and financing from the carbon market as the main ingredients. Specifically, in this paper, we first construct an evolutionary game model to obtain the pure strategies and strategies of governments and PV companies under carbon trading regulation. Second, this paper theoretically analyzes the evolutionary stability strategies for governments and PV enterprises. Third, based on numerical simulations, we obtain the mechanism of influence of carbon trading regulation on the evolutionary game strategies for governments and PV enterprises. Finally, from the perspective of exploiting the emission reduction benefits of PV companies, this paper analyzes the evolutionary game strategy between governments and PV companies under carbon trading regulation.
The results of this paper show that, first of all, under pure strategy, the optimal evolutionary stable strategy for both the government and PV companies is for the government to adopt the subsidy strategy and for the PV companies to adopt the expansion strategy. And the government subsidy strategy has guided PV companies to expand their production strategies. This result shows that government policy guidance and financial support are key factors in fostering and expanding emerging industries. In the early stages of PV industry development, it is necessary to stick to policy subsidies. Second, under the hybrid strategy, the cost of government subsidies is inversely proportional to the government’s willingness to adopt the subsidy strategy, and as the cost of government subsidies increases, the government will be forced to adopt the non-subsidy strategy because it cannot afford the subsidy costs. This result suggests that when the government uses subsidies to guide the development of the PV industry, it needs to reasonably control the subsidy costs to prevent the failure of the subsidy strategy due to excessive subsidy costs. Third, carbon market revenues are an effective boost to replace government subsidies, which improves the financing capacity of PV enterprises and realizes the real market-oriented operation of PV enterprises. Low carbon market returns need to work with government subsidies to jointly improve the returns of PV companies. Higher carbon market revenues can directly replace government subsidies and help PV companies increase their revenue, thus facilitating further PV production expansion. Based on the results in this paper, we further propose corresponding management implications. First, we should give full play to the positive guiding role of policies and explore modes of government-business cooperation. The second is to comply with market rules and enhance the core competitiveness of enterprises. The third is to expand the range of companies that can participate in the carbon market and use the carbon revenues to help finance the PV industry.
In future research, due to the stochastic nature of carbon market prices, further consideration of the impact of market uncertainty on the carbon market financing strategies of PV companies is needed. At the same time, since the parameter assignments in this paper mainly refer to the results of existing studies, further parameter estimation is needed in future studies to improve the fitting accuracy.

Key words: carbon trading regulation, government subsidies, revenue of photovoltaic enterprises, financing strategy, evolution of game