关键词: 政府补贴, 再制造, 博弈论

Abstract: In order to achieve the dual objectives of carbon peak and carbon neutrality, the “14th Five-Year Plan” has clearly proposed that China’s manufacturing industry should establish a green manufacturing system and pursue the path of ecological civilization development. Remanufacturing is an effective way to achieve green manufacturing. Although remanufacturing can effectively facilitate the recycling of waste resources and promote environmental protection, original equipment manufacturer (OEM) retains the intellectual property rights of used products. The law does not tolerate any infringement of intellectual property rights by remanufacturing, despite its potential benefits in reducing carbon emissions. At the same time, the OEM is generally reluctant to engage in remanufacturing due to the lack of proprietary technology for it. However, the OEM may choose a third party for remanufacturing through intellectual property protection. Independent remanufacturing, authorization remanufacturing and outsourcing remanufacturing are the three most common remanufacturing models. Meanwhile, the government adopts subsidy strategies for remanufacturers to promote the development of the remanufacturing industry. The study of the impact of government subsidies on manufacturing/remanufacturing is in line with the strategic needs of national circular economy development. Theoretically, it can improve the theories related to remanufacturing market competition. In practice, it can provide a decision-making basis for the government to improve the subsidy policy and for the OEM to choose the optimal remanufacturing mode. In order to analyze the influence of government subsidies on different remanufacturing modes, based on existing literature and related theoretical studies, firstly, three remanufacturing game models are constructed based on the government’s adoption of subsidy policies for remanufacturers. Secondly, the influence of government subsidies on the optimal solutions of the three remanufacturing modes is compared and analyzed. Finally, the model is validated through simulation analysis using a remanufactured engine as a real case. Additionally, the effect of consumer preferences on the optimal solutions is further analyzed. It has been found that government subsidies will reduce the retail price per unit of remanufactured products and increase the sales volume. Market competition, in turn, causes the market share of new products to decrease. In independent remanufacturing mode, the revenue of the OEM decreases. The OEM can generate revenue from remanufacturing by charging authorization fees based on authorization remanufacturing mode. This can help increase its overall revenue. In outsourcing remanufacturing mode, the OEM transfers a portion of the remanufacturing revenue to the remanufacturer through outsourcing fees, but the revenue of the OEM does not decrease. The revenue of the OEM that outsources remanufacturing is optimal. When the consumer preference is greater than 1/2 and the scale parameter for recycling used products is above a certain threshold, the outsourcing remanufacturing model yields the highest profit for both the OEM and the remanufacturer. The used product recycling rate is greater, and the outsourcing remanufacturing model has the least negative environmental impact when the carbon emissions per unit of remanufactured products are smaller than new products. Government subsidies will promote the development of the remanufacturing industry, but the government should also consider the impact of consumer preferences and carbon emissions of both products on remanufacturing activities, because if the carbon emissions per unit of remanufactured products are smaller than that of new products, but consumer preference favors new products, government subsidies can still reduce the negative environmental impact of both products and promote the development of the remanufacturing industry. The government can increase the sales of remanufactured products by increasing the procurement and promotion of such products on one hand, and by encouraging remanufacturers to improve relevant technologies to reduce the environmental impact of remanufactured products on the other hand. Further research will discuss the situation of information asymmetry between the OEM and the remanufacturer.

Key words: government subsidy, remanufacturing, game theory