运筹与管理 ›› 2022, Vol. 31 ›› Issue (7): 213-219.DOI: 10.12005/orms.2022.0239

• 应用研究 • 上一篇    下一篇

基于电商平台的最优销售模式和退款保证策略研究

魏杰, 舒伯灿, 卢静会   

  1. 河北工业大学 经济管理学院,天津 300401
  • 收稿日期:2020-06-26 发布日期:2022-08-17
  • 通讯作者: 舒伯灿(1994-),男,贵州盘州人,硕士研究生,研究方向:物流与供应链管理。
  • 作者简介:魏杰(1975-),男,山东泰安人,博士,教授,研究方向:物流与供应链管理;卢静会(1992-),女,河南濮阳人,博士研究生。
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金资助项目(71971076);河北省自然科学基金资助项目(G2019202344)

The Optimal Selling Format and Money-back Guarantee Strategy Basedon Online Platform

WEI Jie, SHU Bo-can, LU Jing-hui   

  1. School of Economics and Management, Hebei University of Technology, Tianjin 300401, China
  • Received:2020-06-26 Published:2022-08-17

摘要: 基于一个制造商和一个平台商组成的供应链,考虑消费者退货行为,运用博弈论建立了不同销售模式和退款保证策略下的六个模型。通过均衡解对比和数值算例分析,给出了制造商的最优销售模式选择和制造商与平台商的退款保证策略。研究发现:制造商同时选择转售和代理模式对其自身、平台商和消费者都最有利;在制造商同时选择两种销售模式的情况下,当转售和代理模式下客户满意度都比较高时,佣金费率对制造商和平台商的退款保证策略选择没有影响,制造商始终倾向于提供退款保证而平台商始终倾向于不提供退款保证。

关键词: 电商平台, 销售模式, 退款保证, 客户满意度, 博弈论

Abstract: In a supply chain with a manufacturer and an e-tailer, we use game theory to develop six models under different selling formats and money-back guarantee strategies by considering the consumer’s return behavior. Through comparing equilibrium solutions and conducting numericalexamples, we obtaintheoptimal selling format of the manufacturerandmoney-back guarantee strategies of both the manufacturer and the e-tailer. The results show that choosing both the reselling and agency selling formats is the most beneficial to the manufacturer, the e-tailer and consumers. Additionally, when the manufacturer chooses both the reselling and agency selling formats, the commission rate has no effect on the manufacturer’s and the e-tailer’smoney-back guarantee strategiesif customer satisfaction is relatively high under both reselling and agency selling formats. The manufacturer always tends to provide a money-back guarantee, while the e-tailer always prefers not to provide a money-back guarantee.

Key words: online platform, selling format, money-back guarantee, customer satisfaction, game theory

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