运筹与管理 ›› 2022, Vol. 31 ›› Issue (9): 34-40.DOI: 10.12005/orms.2022.0282

• 理论分析与方法探讨 • 上一篇    下一篇

寻租偏好视角下的标准化参会企业专利策略博弈研究

翟东升1, 金苑苑1,3, 黄怡2, 何喜军1, 徐硕1, 胡涵清2   

  1. 1.北京工业大学 经济与管理学院,北京 100124;
    2.北京信息科技大学 经济管理学院,北京 100192;
    3.北京信息职业技术学院 人工智能学院,北京 100015
  • 收稿日期:2020-07-21 出版日期:2022-09-25 发布日期:2022-10-21
  • 通讯作者: 徐硕
  • 作者简介:翟东升(1963-),男,山西运城人,教授,博士生导师,研究方向:技术情报分析;金苑苑(1983-),女,黑龙江牡丹江人,博士,研究方向:技术情报分析;黄怡(1996-),女,山西怀仁人,硕士研究生,研究方向:大数据分析与智能决策;何喜军(1979-),女,河北文安人,副研究员,博士生导师,研究方向:复杂网络与区域协同创新;胡涵清(1983-),男,湖北黄冈人,硕士生导师,研究方向:大数据分析与智能决策。
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金资助项目(72074014,2020.12-2023.12)

A Game Study of the Patent Strategy of Standardized Participating Enterprises from the Perspective of Rent-seeking Preference

ZHAI Dong-sheng1, JIN Yuan-yuan1,3, HUANG Yi2, HE Xi-jun1, XU Shuo1, HU Han-qing2   

  1. 1. School of Economics and Management, Beijing University of Technology, Beijing 100124, China;
    2. School of Economics and Management, Beijing Information Science and Technology University, Beijing 100192, China;
    3. School of Artificial Intelligence, Beijing Information Technology College,Beijing100015, China
  • Received:2020-07-21 Online:2022-09-25 Published:2022-10-21

摘要: 专利纳入标准使标准的公益性和专利的私利性之间的冲突愈发明显,部分企业在专利标准化过程中的为其低价值专利寻租行为必然会影响其他企业持续研发的积极性,不利于标准的构建和创新的发展。本文在寻租偏好视角下,运用专利组合理论构建了参与标准化企业专利行为博弈模型,并对企业专利行为的演化进行数值模拟,分析企业专利寻租行为的内在动机及寻租的影响因素。结果表明:领域专利组合强度足够大时,企业偏向于对标准必要专利寻租;针对排他性专利标准化竞争,企业能否寻租成功取决于竞争企业与本企业的专利组合强度的对比值;本研究结果以期为我国企业参与国际标准化专利决策提供支持。

关键词: 标准必要专利, 寻租偏好, 技术标准化, 博弈论

Abstract: Patent inclusion criteria make the conflict between the public welfare of criteria and the self-interest of patents more obvious. Some enterprises' rent-seeking behavior for their low-value patents in the process of patent standardization will inevitably affect the enthusiasm of other enterprises for continuous research and development, which is not conducive to the construction of standards and the development of innovation. Based on the perspective of rent-seeking preference, we us enterprise patent portfolio theory to build the patent behavior game model, analyze the enterprises intrinsic motivation in standardization with numerical simulation of the evolution of enterprise patent behavior, and to explore the influence factors of enterprise of standard essential patents rent-seeking. The results show that the enterprises that apply for timely patents have certain characteristics. When the intensity of the patent portfolio of participating enterprises is large enough, enterprises tend to seek rent for SEP patents. For the exclusive patent standardization competition, the success of patent rent-seeking depends on the ratio of the strength of the patent portfolio between the competitors and the enterprise itself. The results of this study are expected to provide support for Chinese enterprises to participate in international standardized patent decision-making.

Key words: standard essential patents, rent-seeking preference, technology standardization, game theory

中图分类号: