关键词: 农产品供应链, 政府补贴, 不利天气, 公益性

Abstract: In recent years, frequent adverse weather has brought great losses to agricultural production in China, and the randomness of market demand has further intensified the difficulty of agricultural product supply chain operation. To ensure stable production and supply of grain and important agricultural products, and improve the income guarantee mechanism of farmers, the government needs to implement subsidy for the agricultural product supply chain, and the weak nature of agriculture also requires that the government must implement subsidy. At the same time, the government builds a public welfare market for the purpose of “providing public services at a low price or for a low profit”, and members of the agricultural product supply chain actively perform public welfare functions to establish positive corporate image to obtain sustainable profit. Therefore, in adverse weather, it is of great significance to study the influence of public welfare and government subsidy on the optimal decision-making of agricultural product supply chain for proposing the optimal government subsidy strategy so as to reduce weather risks in agricultural production, accelerate the construction of public welfare market, and improve the operational stability of agricultural product supply chain.
In this paper, by describing the random profit function of adverse weather affecting the quality of agricultural products, the public welfare of the agricultural cooperative and company is introduced into the government subsidy mechanism of agricultural product supply chain, and a Stackelberg game model is constructed without subsidy as the benchmark. When the agricultural cooperative performs public welfare, the government implements output subsidy or purchase subsidy to the agricultural cooperative. When the company performs public welfare, thegovernment will implement procurement subsidy or sale subsidy for the company. Finally, through a sensitivity analysis, comparative analysis and numerical simulation, the effects of adverse weather, public welfare and various subsidies on the optimal decision-making of agricultural product supply chain are analyzed, and the optimal subsidy strategy is proposed from four aspects: quality-price ratio of agricultural products, consumer surplus, overall social welfare and the utilization efficiency of government subsidy funds.
The results show that: Firstly, the public welfare of the agricultural cooperative and company can alleviate the negative impact of adverse weather on the agricultural product supply chain, but the implementation of public welfare by the agricultural cooperative reduces their own profit, resulting in no incentive to implement public welfare. However, the stronger public welfare of the company will damage the company’s profit, resulting in the limited extent of the company’s public welfare.
Secondly, when the government subsidizes the agricultural cooperative, the incentive effect of output subsidy will be greater than purchase subsidy in terms of improving the quality-price ratio of agricultural products, consumer surplus and overall social welfare, but the utilization efficiency of government subsidy funds will be lower than purchase subsidy. When the government subsidizes the company, the incentive effect of procurement subsidy will be greater than sale subsidy in terms of improving the quality-price ratio of agricultural products, consumer surplus and overall social welfare, but the utilization efficiency of government subsidy funds will be lower than sale subsidy.
Finally, by comparing the output subsidy with the procurement subsidy, we find that the output subsidy has the best incentive effect, and the government should adopt the output subsidy for agricultural cooperative. By comparing the purchase subsidy with the sale subsidy, the utilization rate of the funds receiving the sale subsidy is the highest, so the government should adopt the sale subsidy.

Key words: agricultural product supply chain, government subsidy, adverse weather, public welfare