关键词: 非正式组织, 正式组织, 政府, 再生资源回收, 合作模式

Abstract: In view of the reality that a large amount of domestic renewable resources flow into informal channels, this paper designs a model of cooperation between formal and informal organizations in the recycling of renewable resources with the goal of increasing the quantity of recycling and processing of renewable resources through formal channels, so as to facilitate the transformation of informal organizations from traditional recycling and processing organizations to full-time recycling organizations, thus giving full play to the advantages of flexibility of informal organizations and achieving the goal of “building on strengths and avoiding weaknesses”. The model is designed to facilitate the transformation of informal organizations from traditional “recycling processors” to “full-time recyclers”, thus giving full play to the flexibility of informal organizations and achieving the purpose of “making the best use of their strengths and avoiding their weaknesses”.
This study bridges the gap between formal and informal organizations in the existing research on recycling, and overcomes the shortcomings of a small amount of research focused on the negative benefits brought by the private processing of informal organizations and a lack of analysis of the causes of the advantages of recycling and the inefficiencies of the current governance strategy, so it provides ideas for the rationalization of the operation of informal organizations and expands the scope of the research on informal organizations. It also gives ideas for rationalizing the operation of informal organizations, expands the strategic options for government departments to regulate the recycling market, and reduces the negative effects of social unemployment and intensification of conflicts brought about by the over-suppression of informal organizations by relevant law enforcement departments.
In order to explore the evolution mechanism of the cooperation mode, the article constructs an evolutionary game model with government departments, formal organizations and informal organizations as the main players, and analyzes the influence of different influencing factors on the strategy choices of the three parties in the game; combined with the conclusion of the analysis, the behavioral strategies of the main players in the game are summarized, and the final numerical simulation verifies the feasibility of the proposed strategies.
The study finds that: government departments should adopt the strategy of “increasing penalties and decreasing subsidies” to guide the cooperation, and focus on the two-way strategy of resonance, and the same direction; the formal organization should follow the principle of “the main default, auxiliary acquisition” to regulate the purchase price of renewable resources and the amount of default, in order to consolidate the cooperation with the informal organization; formal organizations should follow the principle of “main default, secondary purchase” to regulate the purchase price of recycling resources and the amount of liquidated damages, so as to consolidate the cooperative relationship with informal organizations; informal organizations will be affected by the triple impact of government penalties, liquidated damages constraints and transfer of proceeds to participate in the recycling cooperation with the formal organizations; the media is an important auxiliary force to promote the government’s active participation in the early stage and smooth withdrawal in the later stage.

Key words: informal organizations, formal organizations, government, recycling, cooperative models