关键词: 再制造供应链, 政府双重补贴, 市场细分, 以旧换新, 以旧换再

Abstract: With the vigorous development of China's auto industry, by the first half of 2022, the quantity of the car in China had surpassed that in the United States and ranked first in the world, however, the market share of auto parts remanufacturing had been far lower than that in the United States. In order to promote the development of our remanufacturing industry, the government has adopted a series of incentive and subsidy policies related to remanufacturing, including both manufacturers' remanufacturing subsidies: consumers' “trading the old for the new” on the supply side and “trading the old for the remanufactured” subsidies on the demand side. In addition, with more and more consumer market segments in recent years, and the rapid development of personalized and diversified market segments, the organization of production on the supply side also needs to change. The existing literature on government subsidies considers the dual subsidies to manufacturers and consumers, but does not involve the dual subsidies that exist in both “trading the old for the new” and “trading the old for the remanufactured”, and there is a lack of research on how to implement the dual subsidies concretely. Based on the background of consumer segmentation and government dual subsidies policy, we divide government subsidy decision into subsidy ratio decision and subsidy total amount decision, and further study two different government subsidy policies and their corresponding impacts.
This paper constructs a Stackelberg game model dominated by the government, obtains the equilibrium solutions under the two kinds of subsidy decisions by a backward induction method, and explores which decision the government takes to ensure the maximization of social welfare, and how the manufacturer price their products under different government subsidy decisions to ensure their maximum profits. Then this paper studies the effects of acceptance degree of normal consumers to remanufactured products, government's attention to consumer surplus and manufacturer's profits on government subsidy decision, manufacturer pricing decision and manufacturer profits, consumer utility and social welfare by numerical analysis. The results can be summarized as follows. First, the government's subsidy ratio policy for recycling and remanufacturing of waste products is conducive to increasing social welfare and manufacturer's profits, and subsidies given to consumers for “trading the old for the new” should be at a higher rate than those for “trading the old for the remanufactured” to accelerate the recycling of products. Second, when the government implements the subsidy ratio policy, the subsidies given to the manufacturer for “trading the old for the remanufactured” are higher than those for “trading the old for the new”, which can reduce the remanufacturing cost of the manufacturer, encourage the manufacturer to carry out active remanufacturing production, and make the price advantage of remanufactured products significant, stimulating consumers to carry out green consumption, thus promoting the development of remanufacturing. Third, on the premise of effectively controlling subsidy expenditure, the government should attach importance to the share of consumer surplus and manufacturer profits in social welfare, encourage normal consumers to carry out green consumption, so that government subsidies can more effectively promote the continuation of product life cycle and the development of circular remanufacturing.
The management enlightenment is as follows: the government should focus on the implementation of the subsidy ratio policy to improve social welfare. In addition, the government should also pay attention to the share of consumer surplus and corporate profits in social welfare under the premise of effectively controlling the expenditure of subsidies. The manufacturer should adjust the prices of the two types of products according to the government's subsidy policy, so that the price advantage of remanufactured products is significant, and can promote the green behavior of consumers. Finally, normal consumers in the market should actively carry out green consumption, and cooperate with the government and the manufacturer to promote the continuation of product life cycle and the development of recycling and remanufacturing, so as to maximize social welfare. This paper only considers the remanufacturing supply chain model of the manufacturer's single-cycle direct selling. In reality, retail channels still occupy a large market share. In addition, the implementation cycle of government subsidy policies is long, so the decision considering multiple cycles is more practical. Therefore, retailers can be included in the supply chain in the future, and the government's optimal dual subsidy subdivision policy under the multi-cycle can be further studied.

Key words: remanufacturing supply chain, government dual subsidies, market segmentation, trading the old for the new, trading the old for the remanufactured