运筹与管理 ›› 2025, Vol. 34 ›› Issue (4): 42-49.DOI: 10.12005/orms.2025.0108

• 理论分析与方法探讨 • 上一篇    下一篇

零售商主导的双渠道供应链下制造商的融资策略选择

毕功兵, 潘昊, 王旭, 王平凡   

  1. 中国科学技术大学 管理学院 国际金融研究院,安徽 合肥 230026
  • 收稿日期:2022-08-07 发布日期:2025-07-31
  • 通讯作者: 王旭(1997-),男,安徽阜阳人,博士研究生,研究方向:平台供应链。Email: xuwang0418@foxmail.com
  • 作者简介:毕功兵(1966-),男,安徽无为人,教授,博士生导师,博士,研究方向:决策分析,物流与供应链金融
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金资助项目(72171214,71571174);国家自然科学基金重点项目(71731010)

Manufacturer's Financing Strategy Choice in a Retailer-led Dual-channel Supply Chain

BI Gongbing, PAN Hao, WANG Xu, WANG Pingfan   

  1. International Institute of Finance, School of Management, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei 230026, China
  • Received:2022-08-07 Published:2025-07-31

摘要: 考虑由单个零售商、单个制造商组成的供应链,其中制造商受资金约束且同时通过零售渠道和直销渠道销售产品。零售商和供应商之间存在斯坦伯格博弈且零售商为领导者。基于该模型,讨论了制造商的双渠道定价策略和融资策略选择。研究结果表明,在零售商主导的供应链中,当两种融资利率相同时,相较于银行融资模式,零售商融资模式下的批发价格更高,加剧了双重边际化效应。当融资利率内生时,零售商更愿意为制造商提供融资,且随直销渠道市场份额的增加而逐渐降低在零售渠道销售产品的收益,更加偏好通过融资来获得更高的收益。而制造商总是偏好零售商融资。最后本文还通过模型拓展研究了中小型制造商面临的渠道物流风险对其收益以及融资决策的影响。

关键词: 双渠道, 资金约束, 融资策略, 零售商融资, 零售商主导

Abstract: The need for more funds has always been an important factor hindering the rapid development of many small and medium-sized manufacturers. The traditional source of corporate financing is mainly bank financing, but there are problems such as the need for adequate collateral, a slow loan approval process, and delayed payment time. Therefore, many retailers provide manufacturers or suppliers with tight financial resources and loan services. On the other hand, with the popularization and development of internet technology, even small and medium-sized manufacturers can directly communicate with consumers and sell products. However, compared to manufacturers who have just entered direct sales channels, especially small and medium-sized manufacturers with poor capital turnover, retailers with strong market dominance often have a dominant position in the supply chain, such as enjoying priority pricing rights. Although the development of financing tools has widened the financing channels of manufacturers, it has also led manufacturers to be more dominated by core enterprises and weakened their bargaining power. Therefore, it is necessary to explore the impact of different financing methods on manufacturers' dual channel pricing and financing strategy selection under the retailer-led supply chain from the perspective of manufacturers in a weak position.
This paper builds a model with the Game theory and analyzes the solution. As a branch of modern mathematics and an essential subject in operations research, the Game theory provides help for this study to analyze the game behavior of manufacturers, retailers, and banks in the dual-channel supply chain. The study considers a supply chain model consisting of a single retailer and a single manufacturer, where the manufacturer is financially constrained and sells products through retail and direct sales channels. There is a stackelberg game between retailers and suppliers; retailers are the leaders. Based on this model, this paper analyzes the choice of dual channel pricing and financing strategy of small and medium-sized manufacturers when facing strong retailers. At the same time, the study uses numerical examples to fit and analyze the pricing and financing decisions of supply chain parties under endogenous interest rates, as well as the profit ranges of manufacturers under different logistics risks.
The research results indicate that when the financing rates are the same, manufacturers will set higher wholesale prices under the retail financing model, exacerbating the double marginalization effect. Retailers will choose to reduce marginal profit, yield to manufacturers with less profits for stimulating market demand, and gain more income from financing services. Secondly, when the financing interest rate is endogenous, under the retailer's financing strategy, retailers, as the strong side of both the marginal profit and the financing interest rate, often need to make a trade-off between their retail revenue and financing revenue, which is mainly affected by the proportion of market share. With an increase in demand for direct marketing channels, manufacturers' bargaining power is enhanced, and retailers will reduce marginal profit, increase interest rates, and prefer financing income. That is to say, the dominant position of retailers in the supply chain gives them more flexible profitability. On the other hand, when manufacturers face logistics risks through their direct channels, banks will further reduce financing rates with increased risk, but retail financing is still the first choice. This study is different from other dual-channel studies led by manufacturers, and the results obtained can improve the financing decision-making of dual-channel supply chain management from another perspective, which has particular guiding significance for supply chain operation management problems with financial constraints.
This paper only considers the situation where the direct sales market is relatively small compared to the retail market. However, some small enterprises have gradually shifted their focus on direct sales to that on the more significant direct sales market, such as live streaming sales. Therefore, in the future, it can be studied whether retailers are willing to provide financing services to manufacturers when direct sales channels have higher demand and how the financing strategies of manufacturers will change. In addition, the focus of this study is channel competition, so it is assumed that market demand mainly depends on price. However, in production practice, demand may also be influenced by other factors, such as consumer behavior and low-carbon factors, which can be explored in different scenarios.

Key words: dual channel, financial constraints, financing strategy, retailer financing, retailer-led

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