关键词: 订单农业供应链, 努力效应, 资金约束, 随机产出, 农业补贴

Abstract: As the economy enters a new normal and the depth of China's supply-side reform, agricultural development has become the focus of reform.“Central Document No. 1” in the past ten years, is focused on the “three rural” issues. It has promulgated a series of agricultural policies, and put forward the “order agriculture” development model, that is, “company”+“farmers” development model. In practice, it has solved the contradiction of “small production, big market” between agricultural production and sales, and put forward the development strategy of “production by sales, production and sales as a whole”. However, with the depth of practice, the financial constraints on farmers are increasingly prominent, according to the “three rural” Internet finance blue paper released in August 2016, the data show that in 2014, China's three rural financial gap exceeded 3 trillion yuan; In 2015, the scale of China's three rural Internet finance was 12.5 billion yuan, and would reach 320 billion yuan by 2020. Thus, agricultural subsidies have become an important policy for the country to protect and develop agriculture. However, for the government, how to choose the target of subsidies, determine the amount of subsidies, in order to maximize incentives for farmers' production inputs, and achieve the optimal effect of subsidies, etc., is a problem worth studying.
Based on the above analysis, this paper raises the following questions under the assumption that farmers have financial constraints: (1)What are the optimal decisions and returns of firms and farmers as well as social welfare under different subsidy strategies? (2)What are the effects of government subsidy rates, bank lending rates and output volatility on the optimal decisions and returns of each subject as well as on social welfare? (3)What are the performances of no subsidy, subsidized banks, subsidized firms and subsidized farmers? How should the government choose?
In order to explore the above questions and provide theoretical references and practical guidance for the formulation of government agricultural subsidy policies, this paper takes as the object of study a second-level order agriculture supply chain composed of a farmer and an agricultural product purchasing company, in which the farmer has financial constraints and the output of agricultural products is stochastic. The agricultural products purchasing company and financial institutions (banks) reach a strategic cooperation to provide financial support to farmers. In order to incentivize the smooth progress of financing, production and marketing in the agricultural supply chain, the government provides subsidies to banks or farmers and companies, and in this context, the optimal decision-making, benefits and social welfare of farmers and companies under these four subsidy strategies are investigated. Under the assumption that the government subsidy support is the same, the optimal decisions, returns and social welfare of farmers and firms under the four subsidy strategies are compared and analyzed, and the optimal subsidy strategy of the government is explored.
The study shows that the optimal decisions, returns and social welfare of the contract farming supply chain under different subsidy strategies are negatively correlated with output volatility and expected return level of capital, positively correlated with the sensitivity coefficient of consumers and the subsidy rate of the government, and that the changes of output volatility, expected return level of capital, the sensitivity coefficient of consumers and the subsidy rate of the government don't affect the size of their rankings. Regardless of who is subsidized by the government, the optimal decision-making of the contract farming supply chain with a government subsidy strategy is higher than that without a government subsidy strategy in terms of revenue and social welfare, easing the pressure on farmers' financing, and the amount of production inputs by farmers, the level of promotional efforts by firms, and their revenues as well as social welfare are the largest in the case of a government-subsidized bank. The level of expected return on capital and the consumer sensitivity coefficient affect the government's subsidy rate.

Key words: contract-farming supply chain, effort effect, financial constraints, random output, agricultural subsidies