关键词: 碳交易, 履约, 再制造, 原始制造商, 再制造商

Abstract: In today's society, with the continuous improvement of the economic level, problems such as excessive energy consumption and global warming are getting worse. Excessive carbon dioxide emission is the root cause of climate change. To reduce carbon emissions and improve the social-ecological environment, the Chinese government has established the carbon trading market to promote sustainable economic development. Under this background, carbon emission rights have become an important resource invested by manufacturers in their production activities, and often have an impact on manufacturers' production and management decisions. At the same time, in the carbon trading market, all participants should fulfill the agreement of the carbon trading market, otherwise they will be punished. The establishment of a punishment mechanism can supervise the performance of enterprises, but it will also affect the profits of manufacturers and remanufacturers to a certain extent, so it is particularly important to reasonably set the penalty amount for an enterprise's non-compliance. At present, academic research on the influence of government subsidies and carbon tax policies on remanufacturing has made plentiful achievements, but there has been relatively little research on the influence of carbon trading on remanufacturing, and limited research on the influence of carbon trading on different remanufacturing modes. In this paper, to investigate the influence of the compliance and non-compliance of enterprises on different remanufacturing modes under carbon trading, we establish the game models of manufacturing or remanufacturing under three remanufacturing modes, namely, authorized remanufacturing, outsourced remanufacturing, and independent remanufacturing, and compare and analyze the three remanufacturing modes in the carbon trading market when the enterprises comply or fail to comply. This paper answers the following questions: How do three different manufacturing or remanufacturing modes affect the production decisions of original manufacturers and remanufacturers under the background of carbon trading? How does the fluctuation of carbon price affect the production behavior of these two manufacturers? What kind of remanufacturing mode does the original manufacturer choose for the maximum self-profit tendency? How do enterprises fulfill their obligations in the carbon trading market? What is the environmental impact of the enterprise's compliance or non-compliance in three manufacturing or remanufacturing modes?
Our main conclusions are as follows: First of all, in the background of carbon trading, the carbon trading price is positively related to the selling price of two products: it is negatively related to the production of new products, and when the carbon emission ratio of two products is greater than a certain threshold, the sales volume of remanufactured products is positively related to the unit carbon trading price. Secondly, the price per unit of new products is the same in authorized remanufacturing and outsourced remanufacturing modes, and the sales volume of new products is the same in authorized and independent modes. Thirdly, the original manufacturers tend to outsource the remanufacturing mode, and when the recycling coefficient of waste products and consumer preference for remanufactured products are greater than a certain threshold, the mutual benefits of original manufacturers and remanufacturers will be realized. Fourthly, in the case of only one production and operation cycle, when the ratio of penalty amount to carbon trading price is greater than a certain threshold, enterprises will choose to perform the contract, and the impact of compliance on the environment is smaller than the impact of non-compliance. Lastly, through the simulation analysis of remanufacturing engine-related case data, it can be seen that consumer consumption preference for green products will also affect enterprises' manufacturing and remanufacturing production decisions under the background of carbon trading. The increase in consumer preference for green consumption will promote the increase of the profit of the remanufacturer, and under the mode of outsourced remanufacturing and authorized remanufacturing, the income of the original manufacturer will also increase.
This study provides a theoretical basis for the government to establish a reasonable carbon trading price in the carbon trading market to promote coordination between enterprises in the carbon trading market and achieve a win-win situation. Simultaneously, the study provides a basis for the original manufacturer to choose which remanufacturing mode to realize the operation of its production activities, making the manufacturing and remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain run continuously and healthily. By doing so, the study effectively facilitates the realization of low-carbon emission reduction targets. Based on the above analysis, although this paper has a breakthrough compared with previous studies, there are still some shortcomings. For one, this paper only considers the production and operation decision-making in one carbon trading cycle but does not consider the situation in which the government reduces the carbon quota in the second year by the same amount if the enterprise is non-compliant. For another, this study only considers the trading mode of purchasing carbon emission rights in the carbon trading market and does not consider the way of purchasing carbon emission reduction in CCER projects. Future research should consider this method for a more comprehensive exploration.

Key words: carbon trading, compliance, remanufacturing, original manufacturer, remanufacturer