运筹与管理 ›› 2017, Vol. 26 ›› Issue (7): 64-73.DOI: 10.12005/orms.2017.0163

• 理论分析与方法探讨 • 上一篇    下一篇

可再生能源价格政策在寡头竞争市场中的比较

刘层层1, 李南1, 楚永杰2   

  1. 1.南京航空航天大学 经济与管理学院,江苏 南京 211106;
    2.东南大学 经济与管理学院,江苏 南京 211100
  • 收稿日期:2015-12-09 出版日期:2017-07-25
  • 作者简介:刘层层(1987-),女,山东泰安人,博士研究生,研究方向:能源投资与政策评价;李南(1956-),女,重庆人,教授,博士生导师,研究方向:能源投资与政策评价,项目管理理论与应用等;楚永杰(1988-),男,山东临沂人,博士研究生,研究方向:机器学习、智能决策分析。
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金资助项目(71273130);南京航空航天大学基本科研业务费项目:不确定环境下我国新能源产业发展战略研究。

A Comparison of Renewable Electricity Support Policies Under an Oligopolistic Electricity Market

LIU Ceng-ceng1, LI Nan1, CHU Yong-jie2   

  1. 1.College of Economics and Management, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing 211106, China;
    2.School of Economics and Management, Southeast University, Nanjing 211100, China
  • Received:2015-12-09 Online:2017-07-25

摘要: 在考虑可再生能源发电间歇性和电力企业两阶段决策过程的前提下,建立了度电补贴和配额制政策下的电力市场寡头垄断竞争模型并进行了分析。以以色列电力市场的数据进行数值实验,分析了电力企业数量、补贴价格、可再生能源电力配额、投资费用等关键因素对发电容量投资的影响。考虑到政策的福利效应,比较了度电补贴和配额制政策下电力价格、消费者剩余和社会福利的差异。

关键词: 可再生能源发电, 间歇性, 两阶段决策, 发电容量, 度电补贴, 配额制

Abstract: The premium Feed-in Tariff(FIT)and Renewable Portfolio Standard(RPS)policy provide investors with incentive to participate in the renewable power production. Based on the intermittency of renewable power and a two-stage decision process of generators, we develop an oligopolistic competition model and apply the game theory to get the equilibrium of the power market. With the data of Israel’s power market, we analyze the impact of the number of generators, subsidy price, the proportion of renewable power and the investment cost of renewable technology on the capacity investment of the power market. Considering the welfare effect of the premium FIT and RPS, we compare the electricity price, consumer surplus and social welfare with these two policies.

Key words: Renewable energy generation, intermittency, two-stage decision process, capacity investment, FIT, RPS

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