恶意欠薪问题的定量分析

doi:10.12005/orms.2018.0257

运筹与管理 ›› 2018, Vol. 27 ›› Issue (11): 61-69.DOI: 10.12005/orms.2018.0257

恶意欠薪问题的定量分析

刘文静¹,杨璐²,刘克²,王颖芝¹

1.中国海洋大学数学科学学院,山东青岛 266100;
2.中国科学院数学与系统科学研究院管理、决策与信息系统重点实验室,中国科学院大学北京 100190

收稿日期:2017-02-17 出版日期:2018-11-25
作者简介:刘文静(1986-),女,山东东营人,讲师,研究方向:随机优化;杨璐(1986-),女,北京人,硕士,研究方向: 随机优化;刘克(1956-),男,北京人,研究员,博士生导师,研究方向:供应链,可靠性数学理论;王颖芝(1992-),女,山东潍坊人,硕士研究生,研究方向:应用统计。
基金资助:
中央高校基本科研业务费专项(201713053);国家自然科学基金资助项目(11501316,71390334,11271356)

A Quantitative Analysis of Malicious Wage Arrears

LIU Wen-jing, YANG Lu, LIU Ke, WANG Ying-zhi

1.School of Mathematical Sciences, Ocean University of China, Qingdao 266100, China;
2.Academy of Mathematics and Systems science, Chinese Academy of Sciences;Key Laboratory of Management, Decision and Information System, Chinese Academy of Sciences;University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100190, China

Received:2017-02-17 Online:2018-11-25

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 在我国,拖欠工资现象仍广泛存在于某些行业中。它引发了被拖欠者的负面情绪,进而带来了种种社会问题,政府部门自然要干预其中。基于欠薪的动态决策过程,本文在劳动者负面情绪阈值的两种分布下,分别讨论了企业的欠薪行为,其结果非常直观地显示了企业恶意欠薪的根源在于“有利可图”。文章从量化角度明确了增强劳动者的维权意识是治理欠薪的有效途径,而政府干预是劳动者维权行为的必要保证。此外,建立随机检查机制可以让政府干预在治理欠薪中发挥出实际效果,政府也可以通过调控经济环境达到治理欠薪的目的。

关键词: 动态决策, 恶意欠薪, 负面情绪, 政府干预

Abstract: In China, wage arrears are still widespread in some industries. Wage arrears will induce workers’ negative emotion which can cause serious social problems and government will certainly intervene. Under two different assumptions on the distribution of worker’s negative emotion threshold, the paper analyzes the firm’s actions, based on the dynamic decision process model for wage arrears. The results intuitively show that the firm’s ulterior motive for wage arrears is greed. From a quantitative perspective, the paper confirms that enhancing the workers’ consciousness of rights safeguarding is always an effective method to solve wage arrears, and a government intervention is an essential prerequisite for workers’ legal actions. Moreover, stochastic checking mechanism can be used to make government intervene in wage arrears governance more effectively. Besides tougher punishments, government could also regulate and control financial markets to intervene in wage arrears.

Key words: dynamic decision, malicious wage arrears, negative emotion, government intervention

中图分类号:

O221

刘文静,杨璐,刘克,王颖芝. 恶意欠薪问题的定量分析[J]. 运筹与管理, 2018, 27(11): 61-69.

LIU Wen-jing, YANG Lu, LIU Ke, WANG Ying-zhi. A Quantitative Analysis of Malicious Wage Arrears[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2018, 27(11): 61-69.

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恶意欠薪问题的定量分析

A Quantitative Analysis of Malicious Wage Arrears

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