平台合作模式对出租车公司利润的影响研究

doi:10.12005/orms.2020.0245

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 基于改进的Salop环形城市模型, 研究了专车公司参与运营的多寡头出租车行业中, 出租车公司为改善利润水平, 可采取的两种合作模式, 即共享需求信息的共享信息模式和共同推出概率性服务的联合行动模式, 并进行对比分析。基于专车公司的在线平台, 采用共享信息模式可提升出租车公司利润水平, 条件是支付一定的平台使用费;采用联合行动模式则一定会提升出租车公司的利润。将两种平台合作模式进行对比分析, 发现当出租车公司有较高的相对运营效益时, 合作程度更深的联合行动模式能给公司带来更高的利润。

关键词: 出租车公司, 专车, Salop环形城市模型, 平台合作, 利润

Abstract: By building a mixed Salop circle city model, this work analyzes two modes of taxi company in oligopoly taxi industry involving ride-sourcing services companies for increasing profits. As the online platform of ride-sourcing services companies leads to effectiveness and efficiency, the paper considers two kinds of platform cooperation modes including Information Sharing mode(IS)and Joint Action mode(JA). Ride-sourcing services companies share platform with taxi company for money under IS. The probabilistic service is provided to passengers by both ride-sourcing services companies and taxi company through the platform under JA, but taxi company does not have to pay. This work indicates that two platform cooperation modes can lead to increased profits of taxi company as well as the profits over the industry. Meanwhile, ride-sourcing services companies can always receive more profits under JA, but receive more profits under IS only if the transaction fee is satisfied. The paper discusses the operation effectiveness forboth taxi company and ride-sourcing services companies. When comparing two cooperation modes, this work concludes that JA outperforms IS when the relative operationeffectiveness of taxi company is high.

Key words: taxi company, ride-sourcing services, Salop circle city model, platform cooperation, profits

中图分类号:

C939
F570

杨彤, 吴江宁. 平台合作模式对出租车公司利润的影响研究[J]. 运筹与管理, 2020, 29(9): 208-217.

YANG Tong, WU Jiang-ning. Impact of Platform Cooperation Mode on Profit of Taxi Company[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2020, 29(9): 208-217.

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