App开发者质量投资和定价策略研究

doi:10.12005/orms.2020.0090

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 本文考虑了由两个App开发者和一个下载平台商所构成的二级App供应链,在开发者间存在价格竞争和质量竞争的情况下,区分开发者竞争、开发者合作、供应链集中决策以及混合竞争四种不同的情景,建立了开发者质量投资和定价决策模型,分析了四种情景下开发者的均衡策略,并通过数值仿真进一步探讨了价格竞争程度和质量竞争程度对不同情境下均衡结果的影响。研究表明,高能力开发者的最优质量投资水平以及最优App价格均高于低能力开发者;价格竞争程度和质量竞争程度对非合作情形下的最优策略影响显著,对合作情形下的最优策略影响不显著;此外,App供应链总利润的高低取决于开发者与平台商之间合作的紧密程度。

关键词: App供应链, 质量投资, 定价, 价格竞争, 质量竞争

Abstract: In this paper, the App developers' quality investment and pricing decision models are built in a two-layer App supply chain which consists of one download platform and two mobile application developers with price competition and quality competition. This paper gives four different scenarios: developers none-cooperating scenario, developers cooperating scenario, chain cooperating scenario and mixed competition scenario. Firstly, the equilibrium strategies of four scenarios are analyzed by solving the profit function. Then, the influences of price competition degree and quality competition degree on equilibrium strategies are compared and analyzed. This paper shows that the optimal quality investment and the optimal App price of high ability developer are higher than those of low ability developer. Second, the influences of price competition and quality competition on none-cooperation scenarios are much more significant than cooperation scenarios. Besides, the total profit of App supply chain is related to the way of cooperation, and the total profit of App supply chain in the scenario of chain cooperating are the highest.

Key words: App supply chain, quality investment, pricing, price competition, quality competition

中图分类号:

F274

张翠华, 许占峰. App开发者质量投资和定价策略研究[J]. 运筹与管理, 2020, 29(4): 54-61.

ZHANG Cui-hua, XU Zhan-feng. Quality Investment and Pricing Strategies of App Developers[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2020, 29(4): 54-61.

参考文献

[1] Asymco.揭露苹果公司的最终存在价值[EB/OL]. http://news.pconline.com.cn/379/3793656.html.
[2] 艾媒咨询.2015年中国手机APP市场研究[EB/OL]. http://www.iyunying.org/seo/dataanalysis/30566.html.
[3] Chernonog T, Avinadav T. Profit criteria involving risk in price setting of virtual products[J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 2014, 236(1): 351-360.
[4] Bresnahan T, Greenstein S. Mobile computing: the next platform rivalry[J]. American Economic Review, 2014, 104(5): 475-480.
[5] Hsieh J K, Hsieh Y C. Appealing to Internet-based freelance developers in smartphone application marketplaces[J]. International Journal of Information Management, 2013, 33(2): 308-317.
[6] Ghose A, Han S P. Estimating demand for mobile applications in the new economy[J]. Management Science, 2014, 60(6): 1470-1488.
[7] Octavian C. The impact of bestseller rank on demand: evidence from the APP market[J]. International Economic Review, 2011, 53(3): 717-742.
[8] Garg R, Telang R. Inferring app demand from publicly available data[J]. Social Science Electronic Publishing, 2013, 37(4): 1253-1264.
[9] Wasserman A I. Software engineering issues for mobile application development[C]. // Fse/sdp Workshop on Future of Software Engineering Research. ACM, 2010. 397-400.
[10] Gans J S. Mobile application pricing[J]. Information Economics & Policy, 2012, 24(1): 52-59.
[11] Avinadav T, Chernonog T, Perlman Y. The effect of risk sensitivity on a supply chain of mobile applications under a consignment contract with revenue sharing and quality investment[J]. International Journal of Production Economics, 2015, 168: 31-40.
[12] 陈剑,张小洪,常炜.双渠道多制造商供应链的Cournot均衡策略[J].中国管理科学,2003,11(z1):284-289.
[13] Cachon G P, Kök A G. Competing manufacturers in a retail supply chain: on contractual form and coordination[J]. Management Science, 2010, 56(3): 571-589.
[14] Giri B C, Chakraborty A, Maiti T. Quality and pricing decisions in a two-echelon supply chain under multi-manufacturer competition[J]. International Journal of Advanced Manufacturing Technology, 2015, 78(9-12): 1927-1941.
[15] 肖迪,袁敬霞,包兴.质量与价格双重竞争情景下的供应链协调策略分析[J].中国管理科学,2013,21(4):82-88.
[16] 鲁其辉,朱道立.质量与价格竞争供应链的均衡与协调策略研究[J].管理科学学报,2009,12(3):56-64.
[17] Kaya M, Özalp Özer. Quality risk in outsourcing: noncontractible product quality and private quality cost information[J]. Naval Research Logistics, 2009, 56(7): 669-685.
[18] Gurnani H, Erkoc M. Supply contracts in manufacturer-retailer interactions with manufacturer-quality and retailer effort-induced demand[J]. Naval Research Logistics, 2008, 55(3): 200-217.