减少弃风的集团内部风、火交易激励机制研究

doi:10.12005/orms.2020.0014

运筹与管理 ›› 2020, Vol. 29 ›› Issue (1): 106-115.DOI: 10.12005/orms.2020.0014

减少弃风的集团内部风、火交易激励机制研究

朱万山¹, 毛启静², 陈珍珍³

1. 中国人民大学商学院,北京 100872;
2. 华北电力设计院有限公司,北京 100120;
3. 清华大学工业工程系,北京 100084

收稿日期:2017-11-07 出版日期:2020-01-25
作者简介:朱万山, 男, 教授, 博士, 研究方向为运营管理;毛启静, 女, 高级工程师, 硕士, 研究方向为新能源运营管理;陈珍珍(1994-), 女, 博士在读, 研究方向为管理科学与工程。
基金资助:
中国自然科学基金资助项目(71371105,51477082)

Study of the Incentive Mechanism of Trade between Windfarm and Thermal Plant within a Company for Wind Curtailment Reduction

ZHU Wan-shan¹, MAO Qi-jing², CHEN Zhen-zhen³

1. 3. School of Business, Renmin University of China, Beijing 100872, China;
2. North China Electric Power Design Institute Co., Ltd., Beijing 100120, China;
3. Department of Industrial Engineering, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China

Received:2017-11-07 Online:2020-01-25

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 本文针对我国弃风限电的现状,着眼于电力集团内部,提出在集团内部设立风、火电交易激励机制,激励风、火电厂自愿达成交易,火电厂为风电场主动避让发电量,在风、火电厂双赢的同时,提高电力集团的总体收益。本论文首先通过建立集团收益最大化模型,对减少弃风的集团收益最大化进行研究,为风、火电交易激励机制设立目标;然后通过建立火电厂收益最大化模型,对单一电价和多阶电价的价格机制分别进行研究,发现基于多阶电价的激励机制有助于激励风、火电厂达成交易实现双赢,同时实现集团收益最大化,而单一电价却不行。集团内风、火电激励机制不涉及我国电力体制改革,便于在电力集团内部推广和应用。

关键词: 弃风限电, 激励价格机制, 混合整数规划, 电力生产

Abstract: To overcome the challenge of excessive wind curtailment, this paper focuses on the incentive mechanism design that encourages the trade between a wind farm and a thermal plant within the same company. The goal is to achieve the maximum profit for the whole company and to improve the profits of both the wind farm and the thermal plant. We first develop a centralized model to maximize the company's total profit by optimally making the production plan for both wind and thermal plants. This model provides a benchmark for decentralized models where the thermal plant and wind plant make production decisions to maximize their own profits. We study mechanisms of a single price and a multi-tier price for the decentralized system, and find that the multi-tier price mechanism facilitates the trade between the windfarm and the thermal plant and improves the profits of all parties to achieve the company's maximum profit, while the single price mechanism cannot do so. The mechanisms within the company do not require the reform of the current electricity policy and can be implemented within a company. Hence, these mechanisms are practical for reducing wind curtailment.

Key words: wind curtailment, incentive price mechanism, mixed integer programming, electricity production

中图分类号:

F123.9

朱万山, 毛启静, 陈珍珍. 减少弃风的集团内部风、火交易激励机制研究[J]. 运筹与管理, 2020, 29(1): 106-115.

ZHU Wan-shan, MAO Qi-jing, CHEN Zhen-zhen. Study of the Incentive Mechanism of Trade between Windfarm and Thermal Plant within a Company for Wind Curtailment Reduction[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2020, 29(1): 106-115.

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减少弃风的集团内部风、火交易激励机制研究

Study of the Incentive Mechanism of Trade between Windfarm and Thermal Plant within a Company for Wind Curtailment Reduction

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