Research on the Evolution of Enterprise Cooperative Innovation Behavior with Strong Reciprocity Theory

doi:10.12005/orms.2017.0275

Abstract

Abstract: In this paper a model for evolution of enterprise cooperative innovation behavior with strong reciprocity theory is established. Enterprises are divided into three types of cooperators, speculators and reciprocators. The basic evolutionary game model is analyzed, and two equilibrium solutions are found by solving the replicator dynamic equations. The evolution model with relax conditions is analyzed by simulation, and a new equilibrium is found. The results show that strong reciprocity behavior can be generated by evolution and it can suppress speculate behavior in the cooperative innovation system. The three types of enterprises can coexist and form the evolutionary stable strategies (ESS).The results provide a basis for decision making in enterprise cooperation innovation organization and help promote further development for enterprise cooperative innovation theory.

Key words: cooperative innovation, strong reciprocity, evolutionary game, simulation research

摘要： 基于强互惠理论构建了企业合作创新行为演化模型,将企业分成投机、纯合作与强互惠三种类型,对基本的演化博弈模型进行了分析,利用复制动态方程求出基本模型的两个演化稳定均衡解,并通过仿真方法对放松约束后的演化模型做进一步分析,发现了新的系统均衡状态并给出解释。研究结果表明:强互惠行为可以通过演化生成,并抑制企业合作创新中的投机行为,与其他两种类型企业共同发展,并形成企业合作创新系统的演化稳定均衡。研究结果为企业合作创新组织的管理提供了决策依据,同时有助于推动企业合作创新理论的深入发展。

关键词: 合作创新, 强互惠, 演化博弈, 仿真研究

CLC Number:

F273

YUAN Chi, YU Hong-lei, YANG De-li. Research on the Evolution of Enterprise Cooperative Innovation Behavior with Strong Reciprocity Theory[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2017, 26(11): 169-175.

原驰, 于洪雷, 杨德礼. 基于强互惠理论的企业合作创新行为演化研究[J]. 运筹与管理, 2017, 26(11): 169-175.

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