Abstract: As a policy pursuit of our government to benefit people’s livelihood and an important move of our government to expand the scale and to improve the quality of preschool education in China, the promotion and development of inclusive preschool education can alleviate the problem of difficulty in entering kindergartens and high cost, and meet the multi-level and diversified requirements for preschool education. On the basis of analyzing the relationships among different parties in pushing forward inclusive preschool education, a model of evolutionary game theory among local governments, providers of inclusive preschool education and families with suitable children is built, and the factors affecting different stakeholders’ choice of strategies are analyzed, so that the conditions for their actions to tend towards stability are determined. It is shown that the evolutionary trend of behaviors of any one of the stakeholders is closely related to the strategies of other two stakeholders. It is of great significance for promoting inclusive education to improve the extra profit of providers of preschool education to cooperate with governments, reduce their cost for cooperation, and increase the loss while non-cooperation. At the same time, it is also of great importance to increase families’ profit and reduce their cost of participation during the promotion of inclusive preschool education.

Key words: inclusive preschool education, government procurement of public service, evolutionary game theory, mechanism of promotion

摘要： 作为我国政府惠及民生的政策追求和扩大我国学前教育规模并提升质量的重要举措,普惠性学前教育的推进与发展可以缓解我国当前“入园难、入园贵”问题,满足多层次多元化的学前教育需求。在分析了普惠性学前教育推进主体相互关系的基础上构建了“地方政府部门-普惠性学前教育供给机构-适龄幼儿家庭”三者之间的演化博弈模型,分析了三方策略选择与行为演化的影响因素,确立了各方行为趋于稳定状态的条件。研究表明,任一博弈主体行为的演化及其趋势均与另两个博弈主体的策略选择紧密相关;降低学前教育供给机构与政府的合作成本、增加其合作的超额收益,同时增大双方不合作的损失,并降低幼儿家庭及公众的参与成本,提高其参与收益,是推进普惠性学前教育发展的关键。

关键词: 普惠性学前教育, 政府购买公共服务, 演化博弈, 推进机制