Abstract: China is advancing the construction of the Grand Canal Cultural Belt at present, and cooperation is important. In order to study the cooperation mechanism among cities along the Grand Canal cultural belt comprehensively and systematically, this paper uses the evolutionary game model and introduces the influencing factors such as economic environment, resource complementarity among cities, income distribution ratio, opportunity income, and penalty costs for the model. The results show that a good macroeconomic environment or a strong resource complementarity among cooperative cities will bring a high excess return of cooperation, so as to improve the possibility of cooperation among cities. The smaller the difference in opportunity income and penalty cost, the more likely they are to cooperate. The cost reduces the possibility of cooperation.The proportion of excess returns among cities will affect cooperation, which depends on the proportion of the cooperation costs and revenue distribution of the two parties. Therefore, it is urgent for the government to adopt policies to encourage cooperation among cities, especially those with strong resource complementarity, and strengthen the supervision. The cooperative cities should pay attention to the design of management mechanism such as interest distribution and penalty mechanism.

Key words: Grand Canal cultural belt, evolutionary game theory, evolutionary stable theory, boundedly rationality

摘要： 目前我国正向纵深推进大运河文化带建设,合作发展是推进其建设的重要手段。文章引入经济环境、城市间资源互补性、收益分配比例、机会主义收益、惩罚成本等影响因子,运用演化博弈研究大运河文化带沿线城市间合作的形成机制。结果表明良好的宏观经济环境或城市间资源互补性强时,带来高合作超额收益,从而提高城市间向合作演化的可能性;机会收益与惩罚成本之间的差额越小,越能提高合作可能性;相反,合作成本限制了双方的合作;此外,超额收益在城市间的配比影响合作,且影响方向取决于双方投入成本与收益分配比例。因此,当前亟需政府采取各种政策鼓励城市间,特别是资源互补性强的城市间利用良好的经济建设环境加强合作,同时提高监查力度。合作城市在合作中要重视诸如利益分配、违约惩罚机制等管理机制的设计。

关键词: 大运河文化带, 演化博弈, 演化稳定策略, 有限理性