Abstract: For the past few years, shared saving model (SSM) has been prevailing in energy performance contracting (EPC) projects in China. Based on the ‘principal-agent’ model, this paper investigates the allocation of excessive energy savings in SSM of EPC projects. The research reveals that the EU’s energy-saving sharing ratio should be no more than 50%, no matter how much excessive energy saving can be achieved. Given that there is an ESCO’s effort cost coefficient and the two parties are both risk-neutral, the optimal approach for allocating excessive energy saving would be more attractive to the ESCO. Furthermore, if the ESCO is risk-averse, its optimal expected energy saving would be influenced by its effort cost coefficient, the degree of risk averse, and the expected variance of energy saving.

Key words: shared saving model, energy performance contracting, allocation of the excessive energy saving, principal-agent model

摘要： 在我国合同能源管理项目中,节能收益分享模式被广泛采用。通过构建“委托-代理”模型深入分析节能收益分享模式下的超额节能收益分配问题。研究发现:(1)无论是否出现超额节能收益,合同中用能方的节能收益分享比例不得超过50%;(2)在引入节能服务公司的努力成本系数且不考虑节能改造双方风险偏好的情况下(风险中性),当努力成本系数在特定的取值范围内,优化后的超额节能收益分配方式对节能服务公司更具激励作用;(3)考虑节能服务公司为风险规避时,其最优期望节能收益不但受其努力成本系数的影响,还受其风险规避程度以及节能收益期望方差的影响。

关键词: 节能收益分享, 合同能源管理, 超额节能收益分配, 委托-代理模型