Evolutionary Game Research on Cooperative Innovation of New Energy Vehicle Industry under Market Mechanism and Government Regulation

doi:10.12005/orms.2020.0128

Abstract

Abstract: Energy-saving and new energy vehicles are the key measures to solve energy, climate and environmental problems, which attract more and more attention of governments.Based on evolutionary game theory, this paper analyses the cooperative behavior of Government-Industry-University-Research(GIUR)new energy vehicles from two aspects of market mechanism and government regulation. First, a game model is established to observe the cooperation behaviors of multiple stakeholders. By analyzing the replication dynamic equation and evolutionary stability strategy, we can get the influencing factors of cooperative behavior. Finally, numerical simulation is carried out to verify the theoretical research. The results show that under the market mechanism, reasonable government subsidies, liquidated damages and income distribution coefficient can encourage GIUR to actively carry out cooperative innovation in the new energy automobile industry.Rational tax rate and administrative penalty under government supervision are conducive to promoting the stability of cooperative innovation of new energy vehicles.In addition, in the process of new energy automobile cooperation, additional social benefits will be obtained, which will increase the enthusiasm of the government to participate in the cooperative innovation activities of new energy automobiles.The results can guide GIUR's better decision in the future.

Key words: new energy vehicle, government-industry-university-research(GIUR), cooperative innovation, evolutionary game

摘要： 节能和新能源汽车是解决能源、气候和环境问题的关键措施,越来越受各国政府的重视。本文基于演化博弈理论,从市场机制和政府监管两个方面分析了政产学研新能源汽车合作创新行为,首先通过建立博弈模型观察多个利益相关者的合作创新行为;再根据复制动态方程和演化稳定策略分析影响合作创新活动的动力因素。为验证理论计算的有效性进行了数值仿真,结果表明:在市场机制下政府补贴、违约金和收益分配系数对企业和学研机构开展新能源汽车合作创新的驱动效果明显,但作用机制不同;在政府监管下合理税率、行政处罚有利于促进新能源汽车合作创新的稳定性。此外,在新能源汽车合作过程中获得了额外的社会收益,这将增加政府参与新能源汽车合作创新活动的积极性,研究结果可以指导政产学研未来更好的决策。

关键词: 新能源汽车, 政产学研, 合作创新, 演化博弈

CLC Number:

F224.32

XU Jian-zhong, SUN Ying. Evolutionary Game Research on Cooperative Innovation of New Energy Vehicle Industry under Market Mechanism and Government Regulation[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2020, 29(5): 143-151.

徐建中, 孙颖. 市场机制和政府监管下新能源汽车产业合作创新演化博弈研究[J]. 运筹与管理, 2020, 29(5): 143-151.

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