The Stability of Industry-University-Research Innovation Alliance Based on Evolutionary Game

doi:10.12005/orms.2020.0315

Abstract

Abstract: The stability of the industry-university-research innovation alliance has a positive effect on the transformation of scientific and technological achievements.Based on reasonable assumptions, this paper constructs an evolutionary game modelof industry-university-research innovation alliance and analyzes the stability of the process of alliance, and uses Matlab for numerical simulation. The results show that the evolutionary result is influenced by the initial state of the system, and is closely related to the level of company’s learning ability, the amount of reputation loss and long-term benefits, the fairness of profit distribution, and the amount of penalty. Finally, some recommendations are given such as constructing a reasonable distribution proportion of excess profit, establishing an effective punishment mechanism, strengthening intellectual property protection and incorporatingenterprise behavior into social credit system.

Key words: industry-university-researchinnovation alliance, stability, evolutionary game

摘要： 产学研创新联盟的稳定发展对科技成果转化具有促进作用。本文基于合理假设,构建了产学研创新联盟演化博弈模型并对联盟过程中的稳定性进行分析,同时运用Matlab进行数值仿真模拟。研究表明:演化结果受到系统初始状态的影响,同时与企业学习能力高低、声誉损失与长期效益大小、利益分配是否公平以及惩罚金额密切相关。最后给出构建合理的超额收益分配比例,建立有效的惩罚机制,加强知识产权保护以及将企业行为纳入社会信用体系等建议。

关键词: 产学研创新联盟, 稳定性, 演化博弈论

CLC Number:

F224.32

ZHANG Gen-ming, ZHANG Man-ning. The Stability of Industry-University-Research Innovation Alliance Based on Evolutionary Game[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2020, 29(12): 67-73.

张根明, 张曼宁. 基于演化博弈模型的产学研创新联盟稳定性分析[J]. 运筹与管理, 2020, 29(12): 67-73.

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