Abstract: In order to explore the competitive strategy of universities at different levels under the stochastic demand of education projects, by using the basic principles of Stackelberg game, this paper constructs a positioning design model for developing similar educational projects in different levels of universities with non-uniform distribution of consumer preferences, and analyzes the influence of the consumption’s preference behavior on the income of educational programs and the competitive strategies of both parties. The results show that H-type universities(higher reputation) are not affected by market factors such as consumer preferences, and always choose the largest differentiation strategy. L-type universities (lower reputation) adopt the maximum differentiation strategy when consumers tend to be on their own side when consumers have indifferent preferences and they are not affected by other factors in the market. When the consumer’s indifferent preference is biased toward other parties, and if the market demand probability is less than 0.5, L-type universities choose the maximum differentiation strategy. Otherwise, L-type universities’ decision will be affected by the factors such as the market probability and Initial Bit Value, and choose the maximum differentiation strategy, limited differentiation strategy, or limited convergence strategy.

Key words: non-uniform preference, competition in university, game analysis

摘要： 为了探究教育项目消费者随机需求条件下的不同层次高校的竞优策略, 运用Stackelberg博弈方法, 构建了消费者偏好服从非均匀分布的不同层次高校开发同类教育项目的定位设计模型, 分析了消费者偏好行为对教育项目收益的影响规律以及双方的竞优策略。结果显示, H型高校(声誉较高)不受消费者偏好等市场因素影响, 始终选择最大差异化策略。L型高校(声誉较低)在消费者无差异偏好偏向自己一方时也不受市场因素影响采取最大差异化策略; 而在消费者无差异偏好偏向它方时, 若市场需求概率小于0.5则选择最大差异化策略, 否则其决策将受到自身初始位值、市场概率等因素的综合影响, 并适时选择最大差异化、有限差异化或有限趋同化策略。

关键词: 非均匀偏好, 高校竞争, 博弈分析