Abstract: When several factors such as market demand, price, risk aversion and so forth interfere at the same time, a game model of supply chain quantity discount contract is constructed to find the internal constraints of supply chain coordination. According to the revelation principle, the CVaR model with multifactorial interference is constructed and solved when the information is asymmetrical. From the simulation results of this example, it concludes that concealing production cost information can bring excess returns to suppliers while entailing excessive losses for retailers. Then, the coupling effect between price random and retailers' aversion risk is the internal cause of the bifurcation phenomenon in each decision variable in the supply chain, and it has nothing to do with whether the information is symmetrical.But information asymmetry will damage the stability of supply chain system.Furthermore, supply chain is in disorder within the region of bifurcation mutation but in coordination outside of it. At last, retailer risk neutral attitudes and the increase of information transparency contribute to improving overall supply chain performance.

Key words: asymmetric information, stochastic price, risk aversion, quantity discount contract, game analysis, bifurcation phenomena

摘要： 在信息不对称条件下,市场需求、价格和风险厌恶等因素同时干扰时,构建数量折扣契约的供应链博弈模型,寻找其实现供应链协调的内在约束条件。根据显示原理,构建信息不对称条件下多因素干扰的CVaR模型并求解,然后用算例仿真,结果表明:供应商隐瞒生产成本信息会带来额外收益,但给零售商造成额外损失。价格随机与零售商厌恶风险的耦合作用是导致供应链上各决策变量发生分岔现象的内因,与信息是否对称无关。但信息不对称会损害供应链系统的稳定性。在分岔突变区域内供应链失调,在区域之外供应链协调。零售商风险中性的态度和提高信息透明度有利于提高整个供应链的绩效。

关键词: 信息不对称, 价格随机, 风险厌恶, 数量折扣契约, 博弈分析, 分岔现象