Abstract: A referral strategy problem of the e-retail with fairness concern is studied. Firstly, we establish the e-retailer’ decision model without fairness concern, and we find that: the equilibrium strategy of the e-retailers is mutual referral in this benchmark. Secondly, we assume the follower (retailer 2) cares for the fairness, in the case of asymmetric information, as the follower’s fairness concern increases, the equilibrium referral strategy are no retailer referral, only the follower (retailer 2) referral and mutual referral in proper sequence, and due to the information asymmetry, fairness concern can induce the follower to adopt referral strategy; under symmetric information, the equilibrium referral strategy are only leader retailer (retailer 1) referral and mutual referral in proper sequence with the follower’s fairness concern increasing. The transparency of information can promote the leader retailer to take referral strategy. Finally, the problem of equilibrium referral strategy under the fair concern of both retailers is analyzed.

Key words: fairness concern, in-store referral, asymmetric information, Stackelberg dynamic game

摘要： 研究了公平关切下网络零售商店内推介策略选择问题。首先,以无公平关切模型为基准,发现无公平关切情形下两零售商均采取推介策略。其次,考虑跟随者(零售商2)公平关切,发现在信息不对称情况下,随着零售商2公平关切程度的增大均衡推介策略依次为:都不推介、仅跟随者(零售商2)推介和都推介,由于信息的不对称公平关切能够诱导跟随者采取推介策略;在信息对称情况下,随着公平关切程度的增大均衡推介策略依次为:仅领导者(零售商1)推介和都推介,信息的透明化能够促使领导型零售商采取推介策略。最后,分析了两零售商都公平关切情形下均衡推介策略选择问题。

关键词: 公平关切, 店内推介, 信息不对称, Stackelberg动态博弈