Abstract: In the conflict of two Decision Makers(DMs)and under asymmetric information, the DM(opponent)who is lack of enough information tends to get the misunderstood preference of the other DM who takes the advantage of information and knows opponent's preference correctly. Obtaining the misunderstood preference can assist the later DM to take the initiative in conflict and to build the induced mechanism in order to maximize its profit. This paper proposes a new way to acquire the misunderstood preference from inverse perspective of conflict resolutionbased on hypergame theory. Utilizing the opponent's equilibrium information presented in negotiation, this paper constructs a 0-1 nonlinear programming model to obtain the misunderstood preference. An equivalent linear programming model is deducted from the original model to facilitate the computation by linear transformation method. All the optimal solutions of the model can be obtained by using the theory of CB cuts and a designed algorithm to exclude vested optimal solution(s). A case about conflict in dual-channel supply chain between supplier and brick-and-mortar retailer is used to present how the model calculates the misunderstood preference.Finally,a summary of induced mechanism, based on the misunderstood preference, is suggested to get more profit for DM who holds more information.

Key words: asymmetric information, hypergame, conflict resolution, misunderstood preference, inverse perspective

摘要： 在信息不对称且对手为信息劣势方的冲突中,对手对决策者的偏好信息容易存在误解,而正确分析对手误解的偏好将有利于决策者在冲突谈判中占据主动优势,并为后期诱导机制的设立提供决策支持。本文基于超对策理论,从冲突分析的反向视角出发,提出了求解对手误解偏好的具体方法,利用谈判中对手显露出的均衡信息,建立了求解对手误解偏好的0-1非线性规划模型。为便于求解,将该模型转化成等效的0-1线性规划模型,并进一步采用CB cuts方法及相应的算法求取该模型的所有最优解。通过双渠道冲突案例分析,进一步验证了该方法对于求解实际冲突中误解偏好的有效性。最后,根据求得的误解偏好概述了决策者如何选择诱导策略,以实现自己利益的最大化。

关键词: 信息不对称, 超对策, 冲突分析, 误解偏好, 反向视角