Abstract: In the context of government subsidies, the game models are established to study the impact of government subsidies, the manufacturer’s and retailer’s risk aversion on green supply chain pricing decision, product green degree, profits of channel members and total channel profit. The results show that: The unilateral risk aversion of the manufacturer or the retailer is beneficial to the other party, but the difference is that product green degree, wholesale price, retail price and its own profit will be lower, while the total channel profit will have both an increase and a decline cases when only the manufacturer is risk aversion. When only the retailer is risk aversion, the product green degree and the total channel profit will rise, and the wholesale price, retail price and its own profit will have both an increase and a decline cases. The increase of government subsidies will aggravate the damage of the manufacturer’s risk aversion to its own profit and product green degree to a certain extent, but will weaken the damage of the retailer’s risk aversion to its own profit, and enhance the lifting effect of the retailer’s risk aversion to the product green degree to a certain extent.

Key words: green supply chain, risk aversion, pricing decision, government subsidies

摘要： 在政府推行补贴政策背景下,通过建立博弈模型研究了政府补贴、制造商和零售商的风险规避对绿色供应链定价策略、产品绿色度、供应链各方利润及整体利润的影响。研究表明:制造商或零售商单方面的风险规避对对方来说都是有利的,但不同的是,仅制造商风险规避时,产品绿色度、批发价格、零售价格及其自身利润都将下降,供应链整体利润则既存在上升也存在下降的情况,当仅零售商风险规避时,产品绿色度、供应链整体利润都将上升,批发价格、零售价格及其自身利润则既存在上升也存在下降的情况;政府增加补贴会在一定程度上加重制造商的风险规避对其自身利润及产品绿色度的损害作用,却会在一定程度上减弱零售商的风险规避对其自身利润的损害作用,并增强零售商的风险规避对产品绿色度的提升作用。

关键词: 绿色供应链, 风险规避, 定价决策, 政府补贴