Abstract: The game decision model of green production under three different market power structures of power generators are constructed based on the latest policy background of renewable portfolio standards. The influence of sensitive parameters on the decision results of the heterogeneous power generators is emphatically discussed, and the optimal decision effects of different game structures are analyzed based on parameter range. We identify the optimal market structure of decision-making effect under the optimal parameter range. The results indicate that, when the transaction price of green certificates and minimum quota ratio exceed the minimum critical value, green generators can achieve the market competitive advantage of optimal output and maximum profit, but?it has a significant “crowding out” effect on the maximum profit of conventional generators. If tradable green certificates price and the price elasticity coefficient of demand are within the optimal and reasonable range, then traditional and green generators can not only achieve the optimal decision-making effect, but also maximize the monotonous increase of social welfare utility, that is, there exists an optimal market decision structure dominated by green generators, but there is no optimal Nash decision structure.

Key words: renewable portfolio standards, conventional generators, green generators, tradable green certificates, market power, decision-making model

摘要： 基于可再生能源配额的政策背景,本文构造了发电商三种不同市场权力结构下的绿色生产决策模型。讨论了敏感参数对异质权力发电商最优决策结果的影响,基于参数范围分析了不同权力结构下的最优决策效果。通过消费者效用、发电成本、环境保护的社会福利函数,识别出了参数最优取值范围内的最优决策效果的市场结构。结果显示:当绿证交易价格、最低配额比例超过最低临界值时,绿色发电商能够实现最优决策效果,但对传统发电商的最大利润产生了显著的“挤出”效应。若绿证交易价格和电力需求价格弹性系数在最佳区间内,则传统和绿色发电商既能够达到最优决策效果,又可以最大限度促进社会福利效用的单调增加,即存在绿色发电商主导的最优市场决策结构,但不存在最优纳什决策结构。

关键词: 可再生能源配额, 传统发电商, 绿色发电商, 绿证交易, 市场权力, 决策模型