Abstract: Environmental regulation is an effective means to release institutional dividends and promote the harmonious development of economy and environment. Environmental taxation and environmental subsidies are the most common environmental regulatory instruments at this stage, and scholars at home and abroad have used empirical analysis or theoretical modeling to explore the impact of environmental regulation on enterprises' green innovation. Theoretical and empirical experience suggests that government environmental subsidies can provide a certain degree of incentive for firms to carry out green innovation activities. However, some empirical studies have also pointed out that environmental subsidies inhibit the improvement of firms' green innovation ability, and the main reason for this phenomenon is catering to government and managerial opportunism. Accordingly, this paper explores the governance mechanism of firms' opportunistic behavior under environmental subsidies by constructing an evolutionary game model, and dynamically examines the existence and mechanism of firms' reciprocal and opportunistic behavior, to fully utilize the effect of environmental subsidies as an environmental regulation tool and realize the “double dividend” of environmental benefits and economic growth.
This paper analyzes the speculative behavior of enterprises and the government's regulatory choices in the process of environmental subsidies using the evolutionary game approach, and proposes the basic assumptions based on evolutionary game theory. Three conditions can be derived when analyzing the system equilibrium strategy according to the revenue payment matrix, four equilibrium points for conditions 1 and 2, and five equilibrium points for condition 3. With the help of three different conditions, the evolution of the strategy choice of the enterprise and government at different profit and cost sizes can be comprehensively examined. Finally, numerical simulations are conducted using MATLAB to examine the dynamic evolution of enterprise and government strategies over time by assigning different values to enterprise gains and government gains, and to investigate how to suppress enterprise opportunistic behavior and promote the transformation of the government-enterprise relationship to reciprocity, so as to improve the efficiency of government environmental subsidies.
The results show that: a)The enhancement of enterprise and government gains can reduce the occurrence of enterprise opportunistic behaviors. b)Government trust can reduce the occurrence of enterprise opportunistic behaviors, while strengthening regulatory efforts can consolidate government trust, so that the system can reach the final stable equilibrium state. Accordingly, the following countermeasures are suggested: First, build a regional green cooperation platform and promote the formation and development of government-industry-university-research green collaborative innovation network. Secondly, the supervision of local governments should be enhanced while the supervision of enterprises is increased.
The article has enriched the research perspective of the impact of environmental regulation on green innovation of enterprises, but there are also some limitations. First, this study is theoretical and lacks empirical confirmation. In the future, the findings of this study can be empirically tested by collecting and organizing relevant data. Second, the structure and relationship boundaries of the group network are not considered in the construction of the revenue matrix, and the utility model can be optimized based on the complex network perspective in the future.

Key words: environmental subsidies, opportunism, green innovation, evolutionary game

摘要： 环境规制是释放制度红利,促进经济与环境协调发展的有效手段。环境税收和环保补助作为现阶段最常用的环境规制手段,前者被广泛关注,鲜有文献重点关注环保补助中的机会主义行为。本文通过构建演化博弈模型深入探讨政府对企业进行环保补助过程中企业投机行为产生的机理及治理机制,动态检验了企业策略及政府监管强度选择的影响因素。研究表明:政府信任能够减少企业机会主义行为的发生,而加强监管力度可以巩固政府信任;政府实施“强监管”策略的动力不足,不仅仅受制于监管成本,更取决于其获取的政治收益。据此提出政策建议,为推动我国企业绿色创新发展提供重要参考。

关键词: 环保补助, 机会主义, 绿色创新, 演化博弈