Abstract: Based on the theory of creating shared value, private enterprises should integrate social responsibility into their development strategies under the supervision and incentives of state-owned non-controlling shareholders, and obtain economic benefits in the process of achieving social goals. In terms of enhancing the economic value of enterprises, private enterprises pursue the maximization of shareholder value, which refers to the maximum sum of value that enterprises can obtain by participating in market exchange. Due to policy bias and government credit guarantees, state-owned capital often receives preferential economic resource allocation in its investment and financing business. According to the theory of resource dependence, when state-owned capital is shared with private enterprises, it will bring this resource allocation advantage to private enterprises. Therefore, state-owned non-controlling shareholders are conducive to private enterprises in alleviating financing constraints, increasing innovation investment, and enhancing market competitiveness, etc., thus achieving the improvement of economic value. In terms of enhancing the social value of enterprises, private enterprises are responsible for stakeholders, society, and the environment in their business operations, and pursue the maximization of social value in economy, society, and environment. State-owned capital belongs to all the people. According to the stakeholder theory, the main business goal of state-owned non-controlling shareholders is to ensure economic benefits while pursuing the maximization of corporate social value. According to the theory of signal transmission, private enterprises actively undertake social responsibility under the supervision of state-owned non-controlling shareholders’ equity and their appointed directors. The good information conveyed can maintain the social relationship between enterprises and stakeholders, and is conducive to alleviating the information asymmetry problem in the capital market, reducing agency costs, obtaining resources needed for development, and ultimately promoting the long-term development and long-term value improvement of private enterprises.
Based on the dual connotations of economic value and social value of enterprises, this study introduces the state-owned non-controlling shareholders to enhance the economic value creation effectiveness, social value creation efforts, and increase resource tunneling costs of the ultimate controller of private enterprises, and introduces the optimal utility function of the ultimate controller to explore the theoretical impact mechanism of state-owned non-controlling shareholders on the behavior of the ultimate controller of private enterprises, expanding the scope of application of the LLSV analysis paradigm in the field of corporate governance, and providing reference for the formulation of policies to effectively play the positive role of state-owned equity. In the study, theoretical derivation and empirical testing are conducted to obtain the impact mechanism of the separation of the two rights of the ultimate controller and the checks and balances of the state-owned non-controlling shareholders on the behavior of the ultimate controller. The results show that: the appointment of state-owned shareholders can enhance the role of the ultimate controller in enhancing the economic value and social value of the target company, and inhibit the ultimate controller’s tunneling behavior towards the target company; state-owned shareholding only has a promoting effect on the ultimate controller’s efforts to enhance the social value of the company, and has no significant impact on the ultimate controller’s efforts to enhance the economic value and resource tunneling of the target company; the appointment of state-owned shareholders can enhance the economic value of the target company and reduce the tunneling of resources from the target company; state-owned shareholding cannot have a direct impact on the economic value and resource tunneling of the target company; the state-owned shareholders need to strengthen their role in enhancing the social value of the enterprise through shareholding and appointment.

Key words: enterprise economic value, enterprise social value, ultimate controller behavior, state-owned shareholding, state-owned shareholder delegation

摘要： 根据创造共享价值理论中企业经济和社会价值的双重内涵,将国有非控股股东增强民营企业终极控制人的经济价值创造效用、社会价值创造努力以及资源掏空成本,引入终极控制人最优效用函数,并通过实证分析检验理论假设,为混合所有制改革背景下,更加有效发挥国有股权积极作用的政策制定提供借鉴。理论推导与实证结果表明:国有股东委派能够增强终极控制人对目标公司经济价值和社会价值的提升作用,不能起到协同抑制目标公司资源掏空的作用,而国有持股仅对终极控制人提升公司社会价值的努力具有促进作用;国有股东委派能够直接提升目标公司的经济价值,并减少目标公司资源被掏空,但国有持股不能产生直接影响,且国有股东在提升企业社会价值方面还需加强。

关键词: 企业经济价值, 企业社会价值, 终极控制人行为, 国有持股, 国有股东委派