Abstract: At present, the world is experiencing profound shifts unseen in a century,and human development is facing more and more major challenges. In the context of globalization, scientific and technological innovation is an important means to respond to global challenges, win-win cooperation is the goal of forming a new type of international relations, and international scientific and technological cooperation is an important measure to respond to the global challenges facing mankind. To distinguish the impact of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (RCEP) on transnational scientific and technological cooperation, study how to promote international scientific and technological cooperation, accelerate the process of scientific and technological innovation, and enable RCEP member states to benefit from the experience and technological advantages from other member states to achieve mutual benefit and win-win results, work together to build a global scientific and technological community are crucial.
Under the assumption of bounded rationality, a three-strategy scientific and technological cooperation evolutionary game model is constructed and a dynamic replication equation is established. Moreover, this paper uses real data from each RCEP member state in 2019 to conduct a comparative study on the evolution paths and stabilization strategies of scientific and technological cooperation between China and other RCEP member states with or without RCEP, analyzes the impact of RCEP on transnational scientific and technological cooperation, explores the main factors affecting behavior, and then provides policy suggestions to promote RCEP to maximize its effect.
The research results show that RCEP can promote scientific and technological cooperation between China and other countries, but for countries with a higher degree of cooperation, its signing means more “free-riding” opportunities, in terms of the impact of RCEP on China, It is said that after signing RCEP, due to the deepening of cooperation and the reduction in monitoring costs, China and other member states will transform their full cooperation strategy into a bullying strategy to obtain “free-riding” benefits. Therefore, this paper recommends the introduction of a third-party regulatory agency to strictly supervise the cooperation between member states, to strongly combat opportunism in the game process, to introduce punishment factors, to increase the crackdown on “free-riding” behavior, and to crack down on “free-riding” behavior. Different countries adopt different penalties and control the intensity of punishment. Based on not affecting the willingness of member states to cooperate in science and technology, the maximum intensity of punishment to warn other countries is chosen.

Key words: RCEP, transnational scientific and technological cooperation, evolutionary game, three strategies

摘要： 国际科技合作是应对人类面临的全球性挑战的重要措施。为判别RCEP对跨国科技合作的影响,本文构建三策略科技合作演化博弈模型,利用2019年各RCEP成员国实际数据,通过对有无RCEP下的演化路径及稳定策略比较研究,得出以下结论:RCEP的签订能推动中国与其他国家间的科技合作,但对于合作程度较高的国家而言,它的签订意味着更多的“搭便车”机会;就RCEP对中国的影响而言,签订RCEP后,由于合作程度加深,监测成本降低,中国与其余成员国均会将完全合作策略转变为欺软策略以获取“搭便车”收益。因此,建议设立第三方监管机制以推动RCEP跨国科技合作产生积极效应。

关键词: RCEP, 跨国科技合作, 演化博弈, 三策略