Abstract: Agricultural industrialization alliances, formed by a diverse array of agricultural operators through contractual agreements, have emerged as a significant organizational model driving agricultural development in the new era. However, in practice, the phenomenon of alienation within these agricultural alliances is frequently observed. This includes issues such as the club-like nature of member organizations, the de-familization of primary operators, and excessive scaling that effectively marginalizes small farmers. Such trends severely deviate from the central government’s policy vision for establishing a modern agricultural management system and achieving strategic goals related to rural revitalization. The underlying cause of these challenges lies in the absence of an effective benefit-sharing mechanism among stakeholders within the agricultural alliance that fosters continuous improvement in agricultural performance. Consequently, this study aims to explore the design of a rational performance incentive mechanism to promote cooperative participating behavior among farmers in these alliances. Establishing a novel cooperation framework that facilitates interest sharing and mutual benefits between primary operators and farmers is crucial for stimulating endogenous motivation toward autonomous alliances among various stakeholders engaged in agricultural land management.
To maximize the performance output of agricultural industrialization alliances and optimize the distribution of benefits among agricultural land operators, this study utilizes agency theory to examine the incentive-related issues associated with the performance of an agricultural industrialization alliance comprising a new type of agricultural operator and multiple farmers. The production efforts exerted by farmers are classified into self-interested efforts and altruistic (cooperative) efforts. A performance incentive mechanism model based on total alliance performance output (UA) is developed alongside an incentive model focused on individual farmer performance (NA). These models are subsequently solved, a sensitivity analysis is made and numerical simulations to assess the results are derived from these models.
The results show that: (1)The effects of the UA and NA incentive mechanisms will be influenced only when the performance threshold set by agricultural regulatory authorities exceeds the threshold determined by equilibrium performance output, allowing the government to guide the behavior of agricultural industrialization alliances through this “target incentive” directive. (2)In low reserve performance scenarios, the two types of farmers’ effort levels, the personal performance incentive coefficient, the alliance performance incentive coefficient, and the total alliance performance output are positively correlated with the effort-performance conversion rate and negatively correlated with the risk aversion factor, while in high reserve performance scenarios, the opposite relationships are observed. (3)Compared to the NA incentive mechanism, the UA incentive mechanism effectively enhances farmers’ enthusiasm for cooperative production and fosters strong cohesion within the alliance. This is conducive to achieving a higher balanced performance output, thereby enabling new agricultural business entities to realize positive economic value benefits. Simultaneously, it stimulates internal motivation among diverse interests related to agricultural land, promoting performance improvement, benefit-sharing, and coordinated development within the agricultural industrialization alliance.
Based on the aforementioned conclusions, the managerial implications are as follows: (1)New entities should be actively guided to establish a comprehensive performance incentive mechanism grounded in a “cooperative” agricultural alliance, thereby fostering collaborative enthusiasm among participating farmers. (2)The government’s “target incentive” directive serves as a guiding framework for influencing the behavior of agricultural alliances, promoting sustainable and high-quality agricultural development while stabilizing alliance performance outputs and mitigating uncertainties faced by farmers. (3)Utilizing performance metrics established by regulatory authorities, we can evaluate the number of farmers engaged in the “collaborative” agricultural alliance to achieve optimal total performance output. This strategy aims to facilitate new entities in realizing positive economic value gains.
Future research may focus on analyzing farmer heterogeneity, examining incentive mechanisms when the new agricultural operator and farmers have different risk preferences, and empirically testing the conclusions drawn from the agency theory framework.

Key words: collaborative effort, agricultural industrialization alliance, performance incentive, benefit distribution

摘要： 为激发农地经营主体间自主性联盟内生源动力、提升农业产业化联盟绩效,采用委托代理理论研究了农业产业化联盟绩效激励问题。将农户生产努力分为利己型努力和利他型(协作型)努力两种类型,建立并求解基于联盟总绩效产出的激励机制模型(UA)和基于单个农户个人绩效的激励机制模型(NA),并对模型结果进行灵敏度分析和数值仿真。研究表明,当农业监督部门设置的保留绩效量超过由均衡绩效产出决定的阈值时,才会对UA与NA两种激励机制效果产生影响,因而政府可通过该“目标激励”指挥棒引导农业产业化联盟行为;相比NA激励机制,UA激励机制能够有效调动农户的协作型努力生产积极性,有利于实现更高的均衡绩效产出,从而带动新型农业经营主体实现正向经济价值收益。

关键词: 协作型努力, 农业产业化联盟, 绩效激励, 利益分配