Abstract: As the fundamental resources of industrial development, the ecological degradation and pollution externalities resulting from the exploitation of mineral resources have positioned them as a central focus for government regulatory efforts and public environmental protection initiatives. Notwithstanding the government’s ongoing reinforcement of the environmental policy framework, violations of environmental regulations by mining enterprises persist, prompting a critical evaluation of the effectiveness of green governance implementation. This study addresses two pivotal questions: (1)What constitutes the causal mechanism through which heterogeneous environmental regulation instruments influence green innovation adoption in mining enterprises? (2)How do strategic interactions among governmental entities, civil society, and corporate actors evolve under differentiated regulatory regimes?
Current scholarship predominantly employs econometric analyses to measure average treatment effects of environmental regulations while utilizing simulation approaches to model stakeholder behavior. However, these approaches frequently overlook the contextualized behavioral responses of enterprises operating under institutional constraints. To bridge this theoretical-empirical gap, our research adopts an innovative tripartite methodology integrating “regulatory regime progression analysis, evolutionary game theory modeling, and empirical case validation”: First, we have established a comprehensive typology of regulatory scenarios:(1)coercive regulation(Stick Approach): pure penalty-based regime; (2)mixed incentives(Carrot-and-Stick Approach): penalty-subsidy hybrid system; (3)voluntary synergy(Sermon-Enhanced Approach): multi-stakeholder co-regulation incorporating public participation. Second, we operationalize this framework through evolutionary game theory modeling, the simulation analysis incorporates three strategic actors: local governments (as regulatory enforcers), mining enterprises (as regulated entities), and the public (as social supervisors). Through computational iterations, we examine behavioral equilibria and convergence patterns across the three regulatory scenarios. Third, we conduct longitudinal case studies (2015-2022) of NRE and Zijin Mining, employing process-tracing methodology to validate the simulation outcomes. This empirical validation examines how these firms adapted their environmental strategies under China’s regulatory evolution.
Our multi-method analysis reveals three key findings:(1)Regulatory Regime Progression Effects: the transition from pure coercion (Scenario 1) to incentive-mixed regulation (Scenario 2) generated suboptimal green innovation outcomes due to subsidy dependency. The synergistic regime (Scenario 3) demonstrated superior performance through its dual emphasis on formal institutions and informal social norms. (2)Stakeholder Dynamics: evolutionary paths exhibited distinct patterns: governmental actors(U-shaped participation curve), enterprises(monotonic increase in green innovation adoption)and Public Participation(inverted U-curve peaking under Scenario 2, declining under Scenario 3).(3)Implementation Paradox: despite theoretical predictions of strong public engagement in co-regulation, empirical evidence revealed declining participatory vigilance under advanced regulatory regimes-suggesting “regulatory complacency” effects.
We makes dual theoretical contributions: First, it extends Porter’s hypothesis by demonstrating that voluntary environmental regulation acts as a force multiplier when synergized with command-and-control mechanisms. Second, it reveals the non-linear relationship between regulatory sophistication and public engagement, challenging assumptions in participatory governance literature. Methodologically, our “evolutionary simulation-empirical tracing” approach advances stakeholder analysis.

Key words: environmental regulation synergy, mining enterprises, green innovation, evolutionary game theory, case verification

摘要： 现有研究多探讨环境规制对企业绿色创新的直接影响,忽视了环境规制过程中相关利益主体的异变与演化。文章融合演化分析和案例验证,基于政府惩罚(大棒)、惩罚+补贴(胡萝卜)、惩罚+补贴+自愿规制(布道)三种“规制累进”情境,分析了地方政府、矿企和公众三方主体的演化和策略选择,并采用了验证性案例分析进行案例回溯。研究发现,规制累进情境下,地方政府、矿企和公众参与分别呈现出U形、正向递增、正向递减差异性演化,最终趋于“政府有为、矿企积极绿色创新、公众参与弱化”的演化状态。研究表明“自下而上”的自愿环境规制优化了政府主导环境规制效果,也折射出推进公众有序有度有效参与是绿色发展和善治的重要方向。

关键词: 环境规制协同, 矿业企业, 绿色创新, 演化博弈, 案例验证