Abstract: In the past three years, with the outbreak and raging of COVID-19, the operation and survival of enterprises encountered difficulties. China State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC) has comprehensively implemented “cost engineering”, focusing on three kinds of cost since 2020: labor cost, procurement cost and outsourcing cost. There is a serious information asymmetry between the headquarter and the manufacturing unit (shipyard), especially in the setting of the man-hour quota. Due to several characteristics of man-hour in shipbuilding, unobservable and incomparable, accounting for a relatively high proportion (about 23% of the total construction cost), the deviation rate between the man-hour quota and the actual man-hour is as high as-62%~30.6%. The man-hour quota is determined by the superior (headquarters) of the manufacturing unit manager, taking into account the observed past performance. As a result, the better performance today triggers the lower man-hour quota in the future, causing the ratchet problem. The man-hour quota is related to the production cost, manufacturing cycle and economic benefits of enterprises. Existing studies on man-hour mostly start from the pure technical dimension, endeavoring to collect and allocate more clearly, predict accurately, and reduce it reasonably, but less considering the influence of managerial behavior, that is, the potential ratchet effect in the setting of the man-hour quota leads to low control efficiency. Rather than recording and studying technical data, we should emphasize contracts, incentives and control of human behavior, and replace Robinson Crusoe perspective with a game theory perspective.
A model is constructed with three basic elements: production relationship, ratchet, and incentive scheme. In order to focus on the influence of ratchet on the managerial behavior and simplify the production relationship, the flexible man-hour constraint can be realized at any time and the inherent man-hour of the manufacturing unit has been given, and the manufacturing unit manager selects the man-hour realization level within the constraints. A lower realized value of man-hour in the current period will lead to a lower man-hour quota in the next period. In order to avoid rigid plans in the future, managers tend to achieve a higher man-hour in the current period, resulting in ratchet effect. Giving a manufacturing unit manager (agent) is faced with a payment scheme: during the reporting period, the manager will receive a fixed salary if his/her behavior reaches or falls below a specific man-hour quota, plus a proportional reward for the difference between man-hour quota and realized man-hour. The headquarter adjusts the quota according to a concise rule, and finds the maximum present value of managers' expected rewards by the stochastic dynamic programming problem caused by solving the set of man-hour realization levels. The strategy improved by Howard algorithm is used to solve the reward value of the optimal strategy and the accompanying strategies. The fixed point theorem is used to prove that there are optimal man-hour quota and man-hour implementation strategy. The optimal managerial behavior for the headquarter is described and compared under different situations (where the inherent man-hour and the man-hour quotas decrease at the same rate, or the former decreases faster than the latter).
It is found that the appearance of managerial behavior with great difference depends on the strength of ratchet. A large reduction rate of quota can lead to a consistent level of effort at the inherent man-hour. However, under moderate taut conditions, the expected result occurs, that is, managers choose to produce at a higher realized value of man-hour rather than at the inherent man-hour, but the behavior can induce agents to signal accurate information about the reduction of the inherent man-hour to the principal. The research suggests that as long as the ratchet degree is not too taut, the optimal action requires the manufacturing unit manager to reveal the reduction rate of the average intrinsic man-hour, and if the headquarter slightly underestimates the reduction rate of the average intrinsic man-hour, then the manager will usually slightly overachieve the target, which is the optimal action.
The research prospect is to apply the method of determining the man-hour quota in this paper to the cost control of shipping enterprises, implement multiple case studies, and verify the feasibility and reliability of the research conclusions through practice.

Key words: time quota, information asymmetry, ratchet tautness, optimal managerial behavior

摘要： 为确定工时定额,制造单元管理者的上级(总部)将观察到的过往绩效纳入考虑,当期更优的绩效水平触发未来更低的工时定额,引致棘轮问题。构建模型,包含生产关系、棘轮、激励方案等三要素。总部根据简明规则调整定额,对工时实现水平集求解,产生随机动态规划问题,发现管理者预期奖励的最大化现值;Howard策略改进算法求解最优工时实现策略奖励值,以及伴随策略;不动点定理证明存在最优的工时定额与实现策略。研究发现,取决于棘轮强度,差异极大的管理者行为出现。非常大的定额降低率能够导致固有工时处的努力水平始终出现,适中紧绷条件下,管理者选择一个较高工时实现值而不是在固有工时处生产,行为却能诱使代理人传递固有工时降低的准确信息给委托人。研究表明,最优行为要求管理者揭示平均固有工时降低率,只要棘轮过程不太紧绷;管理者通常稍许超额完成目标,这一行为将是最优,如果总部轻微低估平均固有工时降低率。

关键词: 工时定额, 信息不对称, 棘轮强度, 最优管理者行为