Abstract: The construction industry is a hard-hit area of environmental problems and suffers from serious information asymmetries. Contractors frequently take advantage of information asymmetries to commit fraudulent behaviors. Greenwashing is a form of fraudulent behaviors and also represents the dark side of construction projects. Although other project participants can restrain the contractors’ fraudulent behaviors through contractual or relational mechanisms, they face many conflicts in implementation. Goal conflicts and task conflicts are two typical conflicts that exist in construction projects. Goal conflicts arise when contractors ignore environmental goals in favor of other goals in the construction process. Task conflicts arise when contractors and other participants have different understandings of environmental tasks. In the face of conflicts, contractors are likely to resort to unscrupulous means to get their interests. Contractors’ greenwashing behaviors not only undermine the environmental performance of the project, but also hinder the sustainable development of the construction industry. Therefore, the main objective of this study is to explore the effect of goal conflicts and task conflicts on contractors’ greenwashing behaviors, revealing the transmission mechanism of conflicts in construction projects, as well as the formation and evolution patterns of greenwashing behaviors.
Drawing on the goal-setting theory, this study conducts a regression analysis of the relationship among goal conflicts, task conflicts, and contractors’ greenwashing behaviors using an ordinary least squares (OLS) model. To examine the dynamic interactions between contractors and other project participants, this study further applies the agent-based modeling technique. The first section reviews the relevant literature. On this basis, this study analyzes the relationship among goal conflicts, task conflicts, and contractors’ greenwashing behaviors, followed by the proposed hypotheses. The second section presents the process and results of the empirical analysis. This study uses interviews and questionnaires to explore the problem of “greenwashing” in the Chinese construction industry. After excluding invalid questionnaires, 586 questionnaires are employed in this study. The data are then analyzed for reliability and validity. The empirical results show that goal conflicts have a significant facilitating effect on task conflicts and contractors’ greenwashing behaviors. Task conflicts have a monotonous (non-U-shaped) facilitating effect on contractors’ greenwashing behaviors. Task conflicts play a mediating role between goal conflicts and contractors’ greenwashing behaviors. In the third section, this study establishes a multi-agent simulation model, assigns corresponding attributes to different agents, and sets the behavioral rules of agents. The simulation results show that the contractors’ greenwashing behaviors exhibit an S-shaped evolution pattern under the influence of task conflicts between the contractor and other project participants. The fourth section presents an analysis and summary of the research results. Based on the empirical results, this study discusses the conflict transmission mechanism, which starts from goal conflicts at the project level, triggers task conflicts at the implementation level, and then influences the formation of greenwashing at the behavioral level. Furthermore, based on the simulation results and logistic growth curve, this study presents a growth model of greenwashing behaviors under the influence of task conflicts. Finally, this study summarizes the theoretical implications and provides targeted suggestions for governing contractors’ greenwashing behaviors in construction projects.

Key words: goal conflicts, task conflicts, greenwashing behaviors, multi-agent simulation

摘要： 工程项目是环境污染问题的重灾区。随着工程项目冲突的加剧,承包商在环境管理中的舞弊行为频发。“漂绿行为”是指环境管理中“言行不一”的舞弊行为。借鉴目标设置理论,本文通过实证研究探讨了目标冲突和任务冲突对“漂绿行为”的影响机理,并仿真分析了“漂绿行为”的动态演化特征。实证结果表明:目标冲突对任务冲突和“漂绿行为”具有显著的促进作用;任务冲突对“漂绿行为”具有显著的促进作用并在目标冲突对“漂绿行为”的作用路径上呈现出中介效应。仿真结果表明:在任务冲突的影响下,“漂绿行为”呈现S型的演化特征,即“漂绿”程度的发展呈现从慢到快再到慢的过程。上述结论丰富了冲突视角下组织行为“阴暗面”的研究,对工程项目 “漂绿行为”治理策略的优化提供了启示。

关键词: 目标冲突, 任务冲突, “漂绿行为”, 多主体仿真