Abstract: In view of the reality that a large amount of domestic renewable resources flow into informal channels, this paper designs a model of cooperation between formal and informal organizations in the recycling of renewable resources with the goal of increasing the quantity of recycling and processing of renewable resources through formal channels, so as to facilitate the transformation of informal organizations from traditional recycling and processing organizations to full-time recycling organizations, thus giving full play to the advantages of flexibility of informal organizations and achieving the goal of “building on strengths and avoiding weaknesses”. The model is designed to facilitate the transformation of informal organizations from traditional “recycling processors” to “full-time recyclers”, thus giving full play to the flexibility of informal organizations and achieving the purpose of “making the best use of their strengths and avoiding their weaknesses”.
This study bridges the gap between formal and informal organizations in the existing research on recycling, and overcomes the shortcomings of a small amount of research focused on the negative benefits brought by the private processing of informal organizations and a lack of analysis of the causes of the advantages of recycling and the inefficiencies of the current governance strategy, so it provides ideas for the rationalization of the operation of informal organizations and expands the scope of the research on informal organizations. It also gives ideas for rationalizing the operation of informal organizations, expands the strategic options for government departments to regulate the recycling market, and reduces the negative effects of social unemployment and intensification of conflicts brought about by the over-suppression of informal organizations by relevant law enforcement departments.
In order to explore the evolution mechanism of the cooperation mode, the article constructs an evolutionary game model with government departments, formal organizations and informal organizations as the main players, and analyzes the influence of different influencing factors on the strategy choices of the three parties in the game; combined with the conclusion of the analysis, the behavioral strategies of the main players in the game are summarized, and the final numerical simulation verifies the feasibility of the proposed strategies.
The study finds that: government departments should adopt the strategy of “increasing penalties and decreasing subsidies” to guide the cooperation, and focus on the two-way strategy of resonance, and the same direction; the formal organization should follow the principle of “the main default, auxiliary acquisition” to regulate the purchase price of renewable resources and the amount of default, in order to consolidate the cooperation with the informal organization; formal organizations should follow the principle of “main default, secondary purchase” to regulate the purchase price of recycling resources and the amount of liquidated damages, so as to consolidate the cooperative relationship with informal organizations; informal organizations will be affected by the triple impact of government penalties, liquidated damages constraints and transfer of proceeds to participate in the recycling cooperation with the formal organizations; the media is an important auxiliary force to promote the government’s active participation in the early stage and smooth withdrawal in the later stage.

Key words: informal organizations, formal organizations, government, recycling, cooperative models

摘要： 本文针对国内大量再生资源流入非正式渠道的现实背景,以提升再生资源正规渠道回收处理数量为目标,设计了正式与非正式组织的合作回收再生资源模式;并通过构建以政府部门、正式组织与非正式组织为博弈主体的演化博弈模型,分析了博弈三方的演化稳定策略;结合分析结论,归纳了各博弈主体的行为策略,最后的数值仿真验证了所提策略的可行性。研究发现:政府部门应采取“增处罚、降补贴”的策略引导合作,并注重双向策略的同频共振、同向发力;正式组织应遵循“主违约、辅收购”的原则调控再生资源的收购价格和违约金额度,以巩固与非正式组织的合作关系;非正式组织会受到政府处罚、违约金约束和转让收益的三重影响参与和正式组织的回收合作;媒体机构则是推动政府部门前期积极介入、后期顺利退出的重要辅助力量。

关键词: 非正式组织, 正式组织, 政府, 再生资源回收, 合作模式