Abstract: As supply chain management becomes leaner and more globalized, supply chain has extended in terms of time and space, increasing its complexity. Moreover, potential factors such as political instability, trade frictions, and natural disasters exacerbate the risks of random supply disruptions. Consequently, how manufacturers develop effective strategies to mitigate supply disruption risks has become an urgent issue.
A two-tier supply chain system is constructed, comprising two suppliers and two manufacturers. In this system, the product manufacturer procures critical components externally to produce product 1, while the integrated manufacturer can produce both critical components and product 2. Considering consumers’ heterogeneous preferences for products and the coopetition scenarios between manufacturers, the study formulates a procurement game model with three strategies: (1)the primary supplier does not experience supply disruption(N strategy), (2)the primary supplier experiences disruption and replenishment is sourced from a backup supplier (S strategy), and (3)the primary supplier experiences disruption and replenishment is sourced from the integrated manufacturer (M strategy).
The study results show that: (1)The effects of “market predation” and “order strategic allocation” during the competitive-cooperative process between manufacturers are identified and quantified at the risk of supply disruptions. The product manufacturer can limit the integrated manufacturer’s profit accumulation through “order strategic allocation”, while the integrated manufacturer can counteract this through “market predation” to accumulate profits. (2)Counterintuitively, the product manufacturer’s profit is higher when the primary supplier experiences supply disruption than that when there is no disruption. The presence of backup supplier facilitates replenishment cooperation between competing manufacturers, and the product manufacturer can leverage the backup supplier to increase bargaining power during replenishment negotiations with the integrated manufacturer. (3)Replenishment cooperation between competitive manufacturers has spillover effects both upstream and downstream, increasing the product manufacturer’s procurement volume from the primary supplier while also boosting the total product supply in the downstream market. This research achieves profit maximization and customer satisfaction maximization, providing theoretical and practical value for supply chain disruption mitigation strategies.
In practical operations, manufacturers often face challenges in accurately obtaining supply disruption information. This information asymmetry can lead to overstocking or understocking, thereby impacting production and sales. Future research could explore multi-sourcing replenishment strategies under conditions of asymmetric supplier reliability information. Additionally, this study focuses solely on consumers’ product preferences. However, in practice, consumers’ purchasing decisions may also be influenced by factors such as the quality, performance, and brand reputation of critical components. Future work could examine how consumer preferences for critical components from different sources affect the replenishment strategies of product manufacturers.

Key words: supply disruption risk, multiple replenishment strategies, consumer product preferences, manufacturers competition and cooperation

摘要： 为解决供应中断可能导致制造商生产停滞、交付延迟等,本文探究上游供应中断的竞争制造商补货策略问题。针对消费者异质性产品偏好行为特性,考虑制造商竞合情景下多重补货策略,构建主供应商不发生供应中断(N策略)、主供应商发生供应中断且在后备供应商处补货(S策略)以及主供应商发生供应中断且在集成制造商处补货(M策略)的采购博弈模型。研究结果表明:(1)识别了制造商竞合过程中的“市场掠夺”和“订单战略分配”效应,量化其在供应中断风险下的影响;(2)反直觉发现产品制造商在主供应商发生供应中断后的利润高于主供应商不发生供应中断,后备供应商的存在有利于竞争制造商间达成补货合作;(3)竞争制造商间的补货合作具有向上向下的溢出效应,增加产品制造商在主供应商的采购量的同时也增加了下游市场产品投放总量。本研究为供应链中断防范策略提供了理论依据和实践价值。

关键词: 供应中断风险, 多重补货策略, 消费者产品偏好, 制造商竞合