Abstract: Product quality information disclosure is widely regarded as an effective means to alleviate the asymmetry of product quality information, but in reality, enterprises often use false quality information. TerraChoice’s investigation report shows that even if the quality is not up to standard, 95% products still make false statements in the process of product quality information transmission. Different from the traditional methods such as ERP and EDI to realize product quality information disclosure, blockchain has become a new way to solve various problems such as information recording, tracking and verification due to its remarkable characteristics such as decentralization, tamper-proof information and consensus mechanism, and has been widely used in supply chain. Although product quality information disclosure based on blockchain technology can effectively improve the authenticity of information disclosure, considering the imperfection of blockchain technology as a solution for false disclosure of product quality information, opportunistic information disclosure behavior of enterprises still exists. Due to the information gap between the physical account book and the electronic account book, enterprises are prone to opportunistic errors in the process of processing the original quality information data into observable information and uploading it to the blockchain. Such opportunistic behaviors are difficult to identify under the cover of the blockchain policy value, and it is easy to establish long-term and improper trust. Therefore, it is of great significance to study the opportunistic information disclosure behavior of suppliers under the background of blockchain technology application.
This paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model involving suppliers, government regulators and consumers, and discusses the following questions: (1)What impact will the imperfection of blockchain technology as a solution to false disclosure of product quality information have on the information disclosure balance strategy? When will suppliers choose to implement opportunistic information disclosure? (2)How can the government supervision department improve the information disclosure policy and design the incentive mechanism to correct the opportunistic information disclosure behavior of enterprises to the maximum extent and protect the rights and interests of consumers? (3)For consumers, is it good to have more product quality information? How will “information noise” affect consumer surplus?
The study shows that: while blockchain technology improves supply chain visibility, it may also trigger the risk of information leakage and reduce consumer surplus. Under the premise of “information noise”, blockchain technology will become an important tool for coordinating and maintaining opportunistic behavior, and responding to external information disclosure policies. The difference in the degree of information disclosure between mandatory information disclosure policies and voluntary information disclosure policies has a negative impact on the standardization of product quality information disclosure behavior of enterprises, while positively affecting the formulation of mandatory information disclosure policies. Based on the research findings, this article provides countermeasures and suggestions from multiple aspects such as strengthening trust and recognition of blockchain technology, improving information disclosure policies, etc., in order to provide reference for blockchain adoption decisions.
This paper assumes that the product quality information comes from a single supplier, and when the quality information comes from multiple subjects, it will be worth further exploring the information disclosure decision of enterprises based on different supply chain structures. In addition, it is also valuable to further study the opportunistic information disclosure behavior of enterprises under the background of blockchain application through empirical research methods such as questionnaires and interviews, and to reveal its formation mechanism.

Key words: blockchain, product quality information disclosure, information noise, evolutionary game

摘要： 基于区块链技术的产品质量信息披露虽能有效提高信息披露的真实性,企业的机会主义信息披露行为依然存在。本文构建供应商、政府监管部门与消费者共同参与的三方演化博弈模型,分析供应商借助区块链技术所带来的信任“伪装”,在产品质量信息披露过程中添加“信息噪音”的披露行为。研究表明:区块链技术在提高供应链可视性的同时也可能会诱发企业信息泄露风险和消费者剩余的降低。在“信息噪音”存在的前提下,区块链技术甚至会成为配合和维护机会主义行为、应对外部信息披露政策的重要工具。强制信息披露政策和自愿信息披露政策在信息披露程度上的差异在负向影响企业产品质量信息披露行为规范性的同时正向影响强制信息披露政策的制定。基于研究结论,本文从加强区块链技术信任和认同、完善信息披露政策等多个层面给出对策建议,以期为区块链采纳决策提供参考。

关键词: 区块链, 产品质量信息披露, 信息噪音, 演化博弈