Abstract: In recent years, the large-scale borrowing of local financing platforms and the hidden debt risks of local governments have become more and more prominent, and the transformation of financing platforms has become an important topic in China’s current social system reform. In previous studies, the theoretical research on financing platform transformation mainly focuses on qualitative analysis and empirical research, while there are few studies on quantifying relevant measures and establishing game models to analyze the dynamic decision-making relationship among relevant subjects, and even less evolutionary game studies on financing platform transformation. Moreover, most of them are pairwise games among local governments, financing platforms and financial institutions, and rarely put these three parties in a game framework for systematic research. Therefore, it is necessary to systematically study the interactive decision-making mechanism and strategy evolution path of local governments, financing platforms and financial institutions in the process of financing platform transformation under the framework of tripartite evolutionary game, which is of great theoretical and practical significance for understanding the financing platform transformation mechanism, optimizing government policy design, and promoting risk control and sustainable development.
This paper mainly studies the following questions: (1)Does Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS) exist in the three-dimensional dynamical system composed of local governments, financing platforms and financial institutions? Is it possible that “ideal equilibrium is the system ESS”? What conditions are needed? (2)What impact does the initial strategy have on the strategy choice of all parties and the system ESS? (3)Will random disturbance factors change the system ESS, and what influence does it have on the attraction domain of ESS? In order to answer the above research questions, a tripartite evolutionary game model among local governments, financing platforms and financial institutions is constructed based on the replication dynamic equation. In terms of model analysis, according to Friedman’s research method and Lyapunov’s first method, the evolutionary stability of game systems is emphatically discussed, and a sufficient condition that “ideal equilibrium is the system ESS” is given. In terms of simulation research, a set of examples are designed according to the actual situation, and the influence of the initial strategy on the strategy selection of all parties and the system ESS is simulated by Matlab R2017b software. By introducing random disturbance factors, the influence of random disturbance factors on the system ESS and its attraction domain is discussed with simulation.
This paper mainly draws the following conclusions: (1)No matter whether local governments guide platform transformation or not, traditional financing platforms can’t get loan support from financial institutions for a long time, and transformation is an inevitable choice for financing platforms. Moreover, the first prerequisite for the successful transformation of financing platforms is to obtain financial support from local governments, and the policy guidance and regulatory restriction of local governments during the transition period are indispensable. (2)The more positive the attitude of local governments and financial institutions towards platform transformation, the more likely and accelerated it is to achieve the ideal equilibrium. Compared with the initial willingness of financing platforms to “transform”, the initial willingness of local governments to “guide” and financing platforms to “lend” is more important, and the negative attitude of either party of the latter will eventually lead to the failure of platform transformation. (3)Random disturbance will increase the uncertainty of the strategic choices of local governments, financing platforms and financial institutions, and aggravate the irregular movement of the strategies of all parties. Although it will not change the system ESS, it will reduce the possibility of realizing the ideal state that local governments and financial institutions fully support platform transformation and financing platforms themselves are willing to transform.
It should be pointed out that this paper only focuses on the interactive decision-making behavior of local governments, financing platforms and financial institutions. However, there are many stakeholders involved in the transformation of financing platforms, and the interest relationship between local governments and financing platforms is complicated. Therefore, more systematic and comprehensive research can be carried out on the basis of introducing more stakeholders and fully clarifying the multi-interest relationship in the future.

Key words: financing platform, market-oriented transformation, evolutionary game, system simulation

摘要： 研究地方政府、融资平台及金融机构在平台转型过程中的策略演化动态,对于理解转型机制、促进风险防控与可持续发展具有重要意义。通过构建三方演化博弈模型,深入探讨了系统的演化稳定性,得出了“理想均衡是演化稳定策略(ESS)”的一个充分条件。接着,通过仿真实验,模拟了初始策略对各方策略选择及系统ESS的影响。并进一步引入随机扰动因素,拓展了系统ESS及其吸引域受扰动的模拟研究。研究表明:(1)不论地方政府是否引导平台转型,传统融资平台都无法长久获得金融机构的贷款支持,转型是其必然选择。而融资平台成功转型的首要前提是获得地方政府的财政支持,转型过程中地方政府的政策引导和监管制约不可或缺;(2)博弈各方对平台转型的态度越积极,就越有可能并加快实现地方政府和金融机构支持平台转型而融资平台自身也乐于转型的理想状态,并且地方政府“引导”和融资平台“贷款”的初始意愿更加重要;(3)随机扰动因素增加了博弈系统的不确定性,进而加剧了各方策略的不规则运动,尽管不会改变系统ESS,但会减小实现理想状态的可能性。

关键词: 融资平台, 市场化转型, 演化博弈, 系统仿真