Abstract: In the supply chain system whose quality of products is jointly determined by manufacturer’s production level and brand merchant’s detection level, we construct the quality controlling model under the environment that the brand merchant is limited to detection level and the manufacturer shares the ratio of external loss, and gives supply chain quality controlling game’s Nash equilibrium solution in the different parameters. Meanwhile, we characterize the mechanism of pure strategy and mixed strategy equilibrium, and analyze interactive coordination mechanism between mixed strategy equilibrium solution and the two parameters of brand merchant’s detection level and the manufacturer sharing external loss ratio. Then, we find out the influence factors of optimal detection probability in repeated game that the brand merchant takes the grim strategy.

摘要： 在制造商生产水平和品牌商检测水平共同决定产品质量的供应链系统中,构建了基于品牌商检测水平有限和制造商分担外部损失比例的质量控制模型,得出了不同参数关系下的供应链质量控制博弈的纳什均衡解,刻画了纯战略和混合战略均衡的形成机制,分析了混合策略均衡解与品牌商检测水平和制造商分担外部损失比例这两个参数之间的互动协调策略,并找出了重复博弈下品牌商采取冷酷战略时最优检测概率的影响因素。

关键词: 生产水平, 检测水平, 检测概率, 外部损失, 质量控制